Negligence and Negotiable Instruments by Whaley, Douglas J.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 53 | Number 1 Article 3
11-1-1974
Negligence and Negotiable Instruments
Douglas J. Whaley
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation





Following the death of her husband, Mrs. Anna Bagby discovered
that she and her two children were beneficiaries of the Savings and
Profit Sharing Pension Fund of Sears, Roebuck and Company, the hus-
band's former employer. Before the children could receive benefits
from the fund, Mrs. Bagby had -to be appointed as their legal guardian,
and to achieve this end she hired a Kansas City, Missouri, attorney
named Marshall Lyons. She was duly appointed, and Lyons sent the
required documents to Sears. Shortly thereafter, as part of the pension
plan, Sears issued several shares of its own stock to Mrs. Bagby, regis-
tered in her name both individually and as guardian of the children.
Unfortunately, Sears sent the stock to Lyons, and he decided to sell it
for his own benefit.
Enter Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., stockbrokers.
Without Mrs. Bagby's knowledge, Lyons opened an account for her
with Merrill Lynch and on four occasions in the spring of 1968 had
Merrill Lynch sell the Sears stock and issue checks payable to Anna
Bagby but delivered to him. He then forged her name to the backs
of -the checks, signed his own name and deposited the checks in his
personal account with a local bank, which forwarded them to the
drawee bank, the Commerce Bank of Kansas City, and received pay-
ment. Mrs. Bagby eventually found out what was going on and sued
Merrill Lynch for conversion of the shares of stock. Merrill Lynch
brought a third-party action against its bank, the Commerce Bank of
Kansas City, for paying the checks without a proper indorsement,' and
this bank passed on the lawsuit in the form of a fourth-party action
against Lyon's bank, which had guaranteed the validity of the payee's
indorsement when making collection of the checks.2
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Indianapolis Law School. B.A.
University of Maryland 1965; J.D. University of Texas 1968.
1. The basis for an action by the drawer of a check against the drawee bank for
improperly charging his account is found in UNEFoam CoMMuRCLrU CODE § 4-401,
which permits a bank to honor checks only if they are "properly payable." A check
which the payee has not indorsed is not "properly payable," and it is basic negotiable
instruments law that a forged payee's signature has no legal effect as an indorsement;
see id. § 3-404.
2. Federal Reserve regulations require member banks to stamp such a guarantee
on all checks in the federal check collection machinery. A similar UCC warranty is
automatically made on presentment of the check; see id. §§ 3-417(1) (a), 4-207(1) (a).
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Mrs. Bagby's suit was settled, but Merrill Lynch's third-party ac-
tion went to trial in a federal court in Missouri. The banks based their
defense on section 3-406 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which
reads:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to
a material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an un-
authorized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration
or lack of authority against a holder in due course or against a
drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in good faith and
in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the
drawee's or payor's business.
To establish Merrill Lynch's negligence, the banks proved that both
New York Stock Exchange rules and Merrill Lynch's own operations
manual established a strict "Know Your Customer" rule and forbade
stockbrokers to deal with a purported attorney for a customer without
checking with the customer himself, getting a written power of attorney,
and sending duplicates of all communications to the customer as well
as to the attorney.3 Failure of a stockbroker to observe the rigid identi-
fication procedures of the New York Stock Exchange rules can result
in civil liability under the Federal Securities Exchange Act.4  The
banks argued that, given this absolute duty, Merrill Lynch was negli-
gent in issuing the checks in question without checking with Mrs. Bagby
to ascertain whether she was -the customer the rule required them to
"know" and if so, whether she authorized Merrill Lynch to deal with
her through Lyons. The district court so held in Bagby v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., but on appeal the Eighth Circuit
reversed.5
The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that Merrill
Lynch was negligent, but found that negligence in the issuance of the
check was not the "proximate cause" of the loss, "proximate cause" be-
ing the relevant question under pre-Code Missouri law. The court
noted that in the earlier Missouri decisions0 the drawer was precluded
3. See N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE rules 401, 405 reprinted along with the Merrill
Lynch Operations Manual in the district court's opinion, Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 969, 976-77 nn.2-5, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 766, 774-
76 nn.2-5 (W.D. Mo. 1972), rev'd, 491 F.2d 192, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 1069 (8th Cir.
1974).
4. See Comment, The "Know Your Customer" Rule of the NYSE: Liability of
Broker-Dealers Under the UCC and Federal Securities Laws, 1973 DuKE L.. 489, 506
n.64 (describing the mechanics of the identification required by the NYSE "Know Your
Customer" rule).
5. 348 F. Supp. 969, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 766 (W.D. Mo. 1972), rev'd, 491 F.2d
192, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 1069 (8th Cir. 1974).
6. Specifically Scott v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938);
American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d 1034
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from recovering only when his negligence led to the forgery, not merely
to the issuance of the check. Section 3-406 of the UCC, according to
the court, had no effect on this pre-Code rule.
What does the court nean when it says that the negligence of Mer-
rill Lynch led to the issuance of the check but not the forgery? Is it
-that the negligence was not the "proximate cause" of the loss? These
questions, and the further one of whether the court was right in its read-
ing of section 3-406, are the topics of this article. When I began this
project I discovered that no one (that I could find) had ever written
more than a few words about this one area in which negligence and
negotiable instruments law overlap. I soon tumbled onto the reason
why. It requires a specialist in both fields to say anything meaningful
about the subject, and few scholars have the time to conquer these two
diverse fields. 7  While I profess to know something about negotiable
instruments, the complicated ideas still being hotly contested in the
negligence arena are not my usual playthings (though I spent a not in-
considerable amount of time in my first year of law school scrutinizing
-them under the watchful eye of the eminent torts scholar, Leon
Green).8 Still the subject is too important to be ignored, and someone
(1933). These cases were both clearly overruled by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
3-405(1)(c) (the "impostor" rule) which makes the court's reliance on them a bit
strained.
7. The only law review article to tackle the subject directly is Britton, Negligence
in the Law of Bills and Notes, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 695 (1924), a rather short (though
helpful) discussion. For partial treatment, useful ideas can be found in Note, Careless
Spaces on Negotiable Instruments, 31 HA v. L. REv. 779 (1918); Comment, Allocation
of Losses from Check Forgeries under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417 (1953). Good source materials on the mean-
ing of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406, particularly on the technical title problems,
are in J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE §§ 16-5 to -7 (1972); Palizzi, Forgeries and Double Forgeries Under Articles
3 and 4 of the UCC, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 659 (1969).
8. Leon Green hates the term "proximate cause" and has attacked it in innumer-
able books and articles. See, e.g., L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927);
many of his splendid law review articles on the subject are collected in L. GREEN, THE
LrioATION PROCESS iN TORT LAW (1965). One of the articles not reprinted there is
Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEXAS L. Rnv. 471 (1950), where
he had this to say about proximate cause:
In little more than a century proximate cause has come to dominate the admin-
istration of negligence law. Its glamor is probably due to several factors. Hav-
ing no integrated meaning of its own, its chameleon quality permits it to be
substituted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision
on that element becomes difficult. The ease with which it permits the lumping
of a whole case into a single conceptual bundle saves the pains of bit by
bit consideration of details and holds out the temptation to save the time and
trouble required for basic analysis. The inability to identify its meaning for
sure renders it immune to effectual argument. No court that takes refuge
in "proximate cause" can ever be convicted of error except by a higher court
that does likewise. Moreover there is a sort of pretension to philosophic learn-
ing implied in seeking a solution of a difficult problem through a search for
1974]
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has to make a start at explaining the concepts involved. Though I have
now done much reading in the negligence field, I am hardly an expert,
,and I invite anyone who is to try a similar article from that point of
view.
The end result of my ruminations is that the court meant that even
had Lyons been authorized by Mrs. Bagby to receive (but not sign)
her checks, he might still have forged her name to them and appropri-
ated the proceeds. Thus, the negligent delivery (issuance) of the
checks to Lyons was not necessarily the cause of -the loss to the bank-
the criminal act of Lyons and the failure of the collecting banks to de-
tect the forgery was the "proximate cause" of the loss. Though it is
a close case, I have come to -the conclusion that the court was wrong
and that section 3-406 calls for a different test and arguably a different
result.
To follow my reasoning it is necessary to look at the common law,
the relevant Uniform Commercial Code sections, and the legal develop-
ment of etiology (the study of causation). We begin with a little his-
tory.
I. THE PRE-CODE POSITION
The 1827 English case of Young v. Grote" was the first major case
to use the doctrine of drawer's negligence to excuse a drawee who had
paid out the drawer's funds in a manner not authorized by the drawer's
order. The drawer, Peter Young, signed five blank checks and left
them with his wife while he went on a business trip. She was to use
the checks to pay the wages of his employees. One of these-the vil-
lain of the case---showed her how to fill out the check for fifty pounds,
but instructed her so that she left sufficient blanks in which he "raised"
the amount to three hundred and fifty pounds and cashed the check
with the drawee. Upon his return, Young sued his bankers, contending
that he had ordered them to pay only fifty pounds. The Court of Com-
mon Pleas recognized the general rule that a banker must pay checks
strictly according to the drawer's order, but held that the rule did not
apply when the drawer was "at fault" and guilty of "gross negligence."
"a," "the," or "the sole," or some other of the numerous variants of the "prox-
imate cause" concept. No other formula . . . so nearly does the work of
Aladdin's lamp.
Id. at 471-72. Green's dislike of "proximate cause" is so strong that there was a rumor
among his students that anyone using the term on the exam, even to comment on it
unfavorably, was a certain failure. Doubtless the rumor was untrue, but no one had
the temerity to try it. I may mention that the man is much loved by his students.
9. 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827).
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The court thought it negligent to have left the signed blank checks with
"a female" instead of with "a person conversant with business as well
as trustworthy." This unfortunate male chauvinistic language has often
been criticized,10 but the case is quite sound on its more general prem-
ise that it is negligence to leave blank, signed checks about without tak-
ing great care to insure that they will be properly completed. To the
extent -that the blanks are completed in an unauthorized manner, the
drawer has elected to take the risk and cannot pass the loss onto his
bank. The case has often been cited by later courts as the premier
recognition of a duty of the drawer to the drawee to draw checks in
a fashion preventing easy alteration. 1
Young v. Grote seems an obvious enough decision, and in similar
fact situations (where drawers sign blank checks and leave them lying
about) all courts reached the same result.' 2 Young v. Grote was not,
however, a popular decision in either England 3 or the United States,' 4
and the courts usually refused to extend it beyond its own facts. The
reason, I suspect, was two-fold. The courts looked with suspicion on
any rule which favored a large solvent bank over its frequently impe-
cunious customer, and the courts were reluctant to impose gigantic
financial penalties for what was often a small fault. In the retreat from
Young v. Grote, some courts said that ,the rule did not apply to promis-
sory notes at all.' 5 The rationale most often given was that the maker
owed no duty to later holders and was not in privity with them in the
same way that a drawer was tied to his bank by a pre-existing contract.
The later holders were not forced to take the promissory note so that
their voluntary action in doing so subjected them to the risk of criminal
conduct on the part of their transferor.' 6 Other courts found the maker
10. See W. BRTroN, HANDBOOK OF Tim LAw oF BILs & NOTES 664 (2d ed. 1961).
11. Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427, 436-37 (1871); Foutch v. Alexandria Bank
& Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 348, 359, 149 S.W.2d 76, 80 (1941).
12. See, e.g., Phillips v. A.W. Joy Co., 114 Me. 403, 96 A. 727 (1916); S.S. Allen
Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County, 192 Mo. App. 476, 182 S.W. 777 (1916).
13. See Baxendale v. Bennett, 3 Q.B.D. 525 (1878) (refusing to hold an acceptor
liable where an accepted draft with no drawer's name was left unattended in a writing
table, stolen and negotiated to a holder in due course). The English reaction to Young
v. Grote is discussed in W. BRIroN, supra note 10, at 664-65; Note, 31 HARV. L. REv.,
supra note 7, at 779-81.
14. See Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52 P. 115 (1898); Hart v. Moore, 171 Miss.
838, 158 So. 490 (1935).
15. Knoxville Nat'1 Bank v. Clark, 51 Iowa 264, 1 N.W. 491 (1879); Cape Ann
Nat'l Bank v. Bums, 129 Mass. 596 (1880); Greenfield Say. Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass.
196 (1877); Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427 (1871); cf. Foutch v. Alexandria Bank
& Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 348, 373, 149 S.W.2d 76, 85 (1941).
16. See the Michigan Supreme Court's lengthy discussion of this point in Holmes
v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427, 435 (1871).
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of the note or the drawer of a draft liable when he left blanks in the body
of the instrument that were later improperly filled in, but not liable
for carelessly leaving spaces in an apparently complete instrument when
a wrongdoer used the spaces to change the nature of the obligation.17
In drawing this distinction, most courts talked in terms of duty; those
preparing commercial paper have a duty to guard against improper
completion of blanks, but have no duty to see to it that every possible
space on the instrument is rendered harmless. 8 One court, in much-
quoted language, said:
Whenever a party in good faith signs a complete promissory note,
however awkwardly drawn, he should, we think be equally protected
from its alteration by forgery in whatever mode it may be accom-
plished ....
If promissory notes were only given by first-class business
men who are skillful in drawing them up in the best possible man-
ner to prevent forgery, it might be well to adopt the high standard
of accuracy and perfection which the argument in behalf of plain-
tiff in error would require. But for the great mass of people who
are not thus skillful, nor in the habit of frequently drawing or
executing such paper, such a standard would be altogether too
high, and would place the great majority of men, of even fair edu-
cation and competency for business, at the mercy of knaves and
tend to encourage forgery by the protection it would give to forged
paper. 1
9
As negligence law developed its doctrinal jargon, many courts
drifted away from an inquiry into duty and began to ask whether the
negligence of the instrument's creator was the "proximate cause" of the
injury. A few courts borrowed the "last human wrongdoer" rule from
tort law 20 and held that the action of the wrongdoer-the intervening
criminal activity-was the proximate cause of the loss; the negligence
of the drawer or payee was irrelevant. 21 Thus in Home Indemnity Co.
17. See, e.g., National Exch. Bank v. Lester, 194 N.Y. 461, 78 N.E. 779 (1909).
18. Id. See also Critten v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 224, 63 N.E. 969,
971 (1902) ("It is not the law that [the drawer] is bound so to prepare the check that
nobody else can successfully tamper with it.").
19. Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427, 435 (1871). Note that the court assumes
that forgery and material alteration are the same thing and call for the same rules.
There is of course a dfference between them, forgery being the wrongful signing of an-
other's name and alteration being the changing of the terms of the instrument. See UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(43), 3-404, -407. Nonetheless, both the courts and
the UCC treat the two problems as identical for purposes of determining the legal effect
of negligence leading to one or the other. See id. § 3-406.
20. See generally Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA.
L. REv. 121 (1937); Feezer, Intervening Crime and Liability for Negligence, 24 MINN.
L. Rav. 635 (1940).
21. Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52 P. 115 (1898); Bank of Herington v. Wan-
Serin, 65 Kan. 423, 70 P. 330 (1902); Glasscock v. First Nat'1 Bank, 114 Tex. 207,
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v. State Bank,22 the Iowa Supreme Court held it was not negligence
to hire a paroled ex-forger, put him in charge of the company's claims
department, and not supervise his activities to see if he was practicing
his old trade;2" but the court noted that even had this been negligence,
the proximate cause of the drawee bank's loss was the forger's activities
and not the negligent supervision by the employer. "If it was negli-
gence, it was not proximate negligence.
'24
[T]he negligence or conduct to be a defense against the negotiable
instrument, must amount to a representation operating as an es-
toppel, and not the mere mistaken issuance of the check, or the
possible cause of the forger's getting its possession. The fraud com-
mitted upon the drawer, or his negligence in not discovering the
imposition upon him, and the forgery of the endorsement and the
wrong committed on the collecting bank are independent torts.
The latter are causes which intervene between the negligent is-
suance of the check and its payment.
25
This idea that negligence in the issuance of -the check was not
the proximate cause of the loss-was picked up and adopted by many,"'
but not all,27 courts. As observed above, the Eighth Circuit in the Bag-
by case found that the doctrine lives on in spite of section 3-406 of
266 S.W. 393 (1924); Greenville Nat'l Exch. Bank v. Nussbaum, 154 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941); cf. Saugerties Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 236 N.Y. 425, 141
N.E. 904 (1923) (similar result in spent bill of lading problem).
22. 233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W.2d 757 (1943).
23. As to the hiring of a convicted forger, the court said that the Board of Parole
thought him worthy of another try and noted that "he had good references." The court
presumed as a matter of law that this was not negligence:
One of the purposes of punishment for crime is reformation of the wrongdoer.
We may fairly assume this object is accomplshed. Was [the employer] rea-
sonably justified in accepting this view? Certainly the company's efforts in
seeking to give such unfortunates an opportunity to regenerate themselves were
laudable. It had employed many such parolees. Placing trust in them cer-
tainly would be helpful in giving them a more hopeful outlook.
Id. at 151, 8 N.W.2d at 784. For similar conclusions see First Nat'l Bank v. Barnes,
44 Idaho 167, 255 P. 907 (1927) (not negligent for mother to entrust checks to her
ex-convict son); Scott v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938) (not
negligent to rehire an employee fired for embezzling $12,500 and put in charge of fi-
nancial records).
24. 233 Iowa at 155, 8 N.W.2d at 786.
25. Id. at 156, 8 N.W.2d at 786. The intervening criminal activity rule applied
as well to alteration of the instrument as to forgery. See Bigelow, Alteration of Nego-
tiable Instruments, 7 HARv. L. REv. 1, 9 (1893).
26. Washington Loan & Trust Co. v. United States, 134 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919); American
Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d 1034 (1933); Fitz-
gibbons Boiler Co. v. National City Bank, 287 N.Y. 326, 39 N.E.2d 897 (1942); Coffin
v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 374 Pa. 378, 97 A.2d 857 (1953); Land Title Bank
& Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat'l Bank, 362 Pa. 30, 66 A.2d 768 (1949); Morris Plan
Bank v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 155 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
27. Connecticut Say. Bank v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 138 Conn. 298, 84
A.2d 267 (1951); Goldsmith v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 55 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1951); Foutch
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the UCC.23  In one circumstance, however, all the courts reached the
result that negligence in the issuance was the proximate cause of the
loss-when the drawer mailed the check to someone having the same
name as the payee intended to receive the check; however, none of
the opinions explained the apparent inconsistency with their other de-
cisions.29 In S. Weisberger Co. v. Barberton Savings Bank Co., 0 the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the drawer was estopped by its negli-
gence from suing its bank for reimbursement when the drawer, owing
a debt to a Max Roth living in New York, mailed a check to Max Roth
in Cleveland, and the latter cashed the check and made off with the
proceeds. Here there was negligence in the issuance, but the drawee
bank escaped liability. The court said, "The misdirected letter was
the source of possibilities that became realities in this case. In other
words, the plaintiff was first at fault, and its mistake made possible what
in fact has transpired."31  The court added that where two innocent
v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., 117 Tenn. 348, 149 S.W.2d 76 (1941); Defiance Lum-
ber Co. v. Bank of Cal., 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935).
28. The now repealed Negotiable Instruments Law, which was in effect when many
of these decisions were written, was no more help than section 3-406. Section 23 of
the NIL invalidated forgeries unless the alleged signer was "precluded" from setting up
the forgery; Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-404. The courts held that "precluded"
meant "estopped" and that any estoppel was grounded on ratification or negligence; see,
e.g., Citizens' Union Nat'l Bank v. Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 50 S.W.2d 60 (1932); First Nat'1
Bank v. Albright, 111 Pa. Super. 392, 170 A. 370 (1934); Woodward, The Risk of
Forgery or Alteration of Negotiable Instruments, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 469, 472 (1924);
Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 638 (1963); Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 641 (1955). The NIL had no
general provision on the effect of negligence. As to material alteration, the NIL ap-
peared to provide for absolute discharge of the drawer or maker irrespective of his negli-
gence. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw §§ 15, 124. At least one court so held. Com-
mercial Bank v. Arden & Fraley, 177 Ky. 520, 197 S.W. 951 (1917), "riticized in W.
BlurroN, supra note 10, at 668. Other courts held that the NIL worked no change on
the law of negligence and subsequent material alterations; see, e.g., S.S. Allen Grocery
Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County, 192 Mo. App. 476, 182 S.W. 777 (1916).
29. United States v. Union Trust Co., 139 F. Supp. 819 (D. Md. 1956) (confusion
in VA office resulting in years of mismailed checks); Citizens' Union Nat'l Bank v. Ter-
rell, 244 Ky. 16, 50 S.W.2d 60 (1932) (probate settlement check mailed to wrong per-
son); Slattery & Co. v. National City Bank, 114 Misc. 48, 186 N.Y.S. 679 (New York
City Mun. Ct. 1920) (stockbroker mailed check to wrong client having same name as
owner of stock); S. Weisberger Co. v. Barberton Say. Bank Co., 84 Ohio St. 21, 95
N.E. 379 (1911) (see text accompanying notes 30-32 infra); Jones v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 106 Okla. 162, 233 P. 472 (1923) (holding that drawer was negligent in mailing
a check to wrong payee, but that this negligence was not available as a defense in a
suit by the drawee bank against the depositary bank). The only cases to the contrary
are either very old, Graves v. American Exch. Bank, 17 N.Y. 205 (1858), or have since
been impliedly overruled. Compare State Bank v. Mid-City Trust & Say. Bank, 232 Ill.
App. 186, 129 N.E. 498 (1924), with Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc.,
59 Ill. App. 2d 235, 207 N.E.2d 158, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 903 (1965) (a UCC case
reaching a result in harmony with the above decisions); cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-406, Comment 7.
30. 84 Ohio St. 21, 95 N.E. 379 (1911).
31. Id. at 31, 95 N.E. at 381.
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1ersons are involved in a lawsuit, "justice imposes the burden upon him
who is first at fault and put in operation the power which resulted in
the fraud or forgery.
32
It is hard to see why negligence in the issuance in this situation
is -the "proximate cause" of the loss and in other situations it is not.
Similarly, we must ask why courts denied recovery to a drawer or maker
who negligently signed an instrument containing blanks, but permitted
his recovery in many cases in which he carelessly left large spaces on
an apparently complete instrument. One simple answer is that the
negligence of the drawer/maker was a bar to his assertion of forgery
or alteration if his conduct was considered to be outrageous in the sense
of "grossly negligent" or "commercially unreasonable." This explana-
tion does not account for decisions like the Iowa case discussed above 3
in which the employer hired a paroled felon and did not carefully watch
his handling of the company's checks, but was still allowed to recover
from its bank. Surely this conduct is extremely negligent. On the
other hand, the mailing of a check to a payee with -the same name as
the intended recipient, while careless, does not seem to be outrageous
or grossly negligent conduct, particularly if the drawer is a large com-
pany with thousands of creditors; yet, here, the courts uniformly im-
posed estoppel by negligence. In addition, the "outrageous conduct"
test does not explain why many courts held the creator of an instrument
bound by blanks completed by a wrongdoer but not by spaces, even
large ones, left on the instrument and utilized by a malefactor. "Out-
rageous conduct" was of course the basis of many decisions,3 4 but most
32. Id. This "two innocent persons" rule has been variously stated and is regularly
trotted out to decorate an opinion in which the court has decided to let the negligence
be a bar to the lawsuit; see Cureton v. Farmers' State Bank, 147 Ark. 312, 318, 227
S.W. 423, 424 (1921) ("Mhe loss must fall upon that one whose acts contributed most
to produce it."); Goldsmith v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 50 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1951); Citizens'
Union Nat'l Bank v. Terrell, 244 Ky. 16, 50 S.W.2d 60 (1932); Phillips v. A.W. Joy
Co., 114 Me. 403, 96 A. 727 (1916); Garrard v. Haddan, 67 Pa. 82, 85 (1870); De-
fiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal., 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935). On the other
hand, when the negligence is excused by the court, the "two innocent persons" rule is
generally pooh-poohed; see Bank of Herington v. Wangerin, 65 Kan. 423, 70 P. 330
(1902) (rule applies only where trust reposed in wrongdoer); Holmes v. Trumper, 22
Mich. 427 (1871) (rule applies only where the wrongdoer is the agent of the maker);
Broad St. Bank v. National Bank, 183 N.C. 463, 112 S.E. 11 (1922) (rule applies only
where the wrongdoer was an agent of the drawer). See also Gresham State Bank v.
O & K Constr. Co., 231 Ore. 106, 115-19, 370 P.2d 726, 729, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 276,
280 (1962) (the first UCC case to consider whether this was a substantive defense; the
court concluded it was not).
33. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
34. Examples of a more liberal use of the "negligence as estoppel" principle are
Connecticut Say. Bank v. First Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 138 Conn. 298, 84 A.2d 267
(1951) (delivery of check to non-agent); Goldsmith v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 55 So. 2d
1974]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
courts demanded something more. I submit that this "something
more" was the complete inability of later parties to protect themselves
from the negligent party's conduct.
In the situation of a drawer of a check who simply signs an instru-
ment containing one or more blanks that later are improperly filled in,
no amount of care by the drawee bank can detect the wrongdoing, at
least in the typical case. It is not unusual for check writers to let some-
one else fill in the body of the check, and the drawee dishonors such
a check at the risk of substantial damages.8 5 The same thing is true
of holders purchasing a promissory note with blanks completed by
someone other than the maker-hardly an extraordinary circumstance.
How are they to know the completion is unauthorized? When the
drawer mails the check to someone having the same name as the payee,
the wrongful recipient will be able to produce legitimate identification
when the check is cashed; the drawee has no way of knowing that the
drawer meant the check .to go elsewhere.
In the cases in which the negligence was held not to be a bar to
the drawer/maker's recovery, the drawee or the later holders had some
chance, though sometimes a slim one, to detect the wrongdoing and
avoid -the loss. Thus the use of spaces between words on an instrument
to change the original obligation may act as a red light (or at least a
pink one) to those taking the instrument due to the necessarily
cramped appearance or the contrast with the other words. If there is
negligent supervision of employees or issuance of a check to a
non-agent, the wrongdoer must still convince someone that the forged
indorsement is valid or the check cannot be negotiated. It is this exist-
ence of a second chance to avoid the loss that dispelled the effect of
the earlier negligence at common law.
11. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE POSITION
The basic position taken by the Uniform Commercial Code is that
804 (Fla. 1951) (letting employee fill out own paycheck and signing by employer with-
out noting spaces making check easily raised); Hackett v. First Nat'l Bank, 114 Ky. 193,
70 S.W. 664 (1902) (accomodation maker liable for signing note containing spaces used
by the maker to raise the amount); Harvey v. Smith, 55 Ill. 224 (1870) (using pencil
held to be "gross carelessness"); Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 348,
149 S.W.2d 76 (1941) (negligence of drawer was letting payee make out the check in
pencil and leaving spaces thereon); Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal., 180 Wash.
533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935) (failure to supervise employee).
35. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402, which limits the bank's responsibil-
ity for mistaken dishonor. As for deliberate dishonor, the bank may still be subject to
punitive damages. See J. WrmTE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 7, at § 17-4.
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forgery36 and material alteration" render an instrument ineffective un-
less the defendant is precluded from raising these defenses. This "pre-
clusion" may take the form of ratification,"8 apparent authority granted
to a non-agent by careless conduct on the part of a principal,3" and neg-
ligence. Negligence as a precluding act is dealt with under three dif-
ferent sections: section 3-405, which establishes the validity of forged
signatures in imposter/ficticious payee situations, section 3-406, the
basic negligence rule quoted above in the discussion of the Bagby case,
and section 4-406, dealing with failure of the drawer to examine his
bank statements and discover the wrongdoing. It is these latter three
sections, and particularly section 3-406, with which we are concerned.
Section 3-40540 is a codification and extension of the common law
"impostor" rule41 and the "ficticious payee" rule found in section 9(3)
of the Negotiable Instruments Law.42 The "impostor" rule places the
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-404(1) states: "Any unauthorized signature
is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it
or is precluded from denying it; but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized
signer in favor of any person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for
value."
37. Id. § 3-407(2) provides that a fraudulent material alteration by a holder com-
pletely discharges any party whose contract is changed thereby, "[u]nless that party...
is precluded from asserting the defense . . . ." A holder in due course and the drawee
bank may enforce the instrument according to its original tenor; id. H§ 3-407(3),
4-401(2). As to blanks in instruments see id. § 3-115.
38. See id. § 3-404. Ratification, for negotiable instrument purposes, occurs when
the party in question, with full knowledge of the forgery or alteration, accepts the bene-
fits thereof or actively assents to the wrongful activity; see Rakestraw v. Rodrignes, 8
Cal. 3d 67, 500 P.2d 1401, 104 Cal. Rptr. 57, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 780 (1972); cf. Sals-
man v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162, 5 UCC Rep.
Serv. 779 (L. Div. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 105 NJ. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460, 6 UCC
Rep. Serv. 168 (App. Div. 1969).
39. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-403(1) & Comment 1. The major UCC
case is Senate Motors, Inc. v. Industrial Bank, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 387 (D.C. Super. Ct.
1971). For pre-Code cases finding apparent authority in an agent to cash the alleged
principal's checks see Corbett v. Kleinsmith, 112 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1940); Commercial
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Isbell Nat'l Bank, 223 Ala. 48, 134 So. 810 (1931); Arcade Realty Co.
v. Bank of Commerce, 180 Cal. 318, 181 P. 66 (1919); Rosser-Moon Furniture Co. v.
Oklahoma State Bank, 192 Okla. 169, 135 P.2d 336 (1943).
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405(1) states:
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective
if
(a) an impostor by use of the mails or otherwise has induced the maker
or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the
name of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with
the name of the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
41. For an example of the common law version of the impostor rule (which was
usually based on the drawer's negligence in failing to ascertain the true identity of his
issuee) see Cureton v. Farmers' State Bank, 147 Ark. 312, 227 S.W. 423 (1921).
42. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 9(3) provided that an instrument was bearer
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risk of forgery on the maker/drawer if he has been duped into issuing
the instrument to a person posing as the payee. The section 3-405
(1)(a) version of this rule rejects the occasional pre-Code cases that
relied on the "negligent issuance not proximate cause" rationale to per-
mit the drawer/maker to assert the forgery.48  Sections 3-405(1)(b)
and (c) validate the forged payee's signature whenever the draw-
er/maker (or his agent or employee) does not intend that the named
payee have an interest in the instrument. The normal situations re-
quiring the application of this rule involve an employee of the drawer
who either pads the payroll ,by adding phoney employees or submits
non-existent bills from supposed creditors44 and then absconds with
proceeds of the resulting checks. There are fifty or more pre-Code
cases holding that check issuance in this situation was not the proximate
cause of the loss, and section 3-405 overthrows them completely.40
Official Comment 4 to section 3-405 states the policy justification for
imposing liability on the employer:
The principle followed is that the loss should fall upon the em-
ployer as a risk of his business enterprise rather than upon the sub-
sequent holder or drawee. The reasons are that the employer is
paper when it was knowingly made payable to the order of a fictitious person. Under
section 3-405 of the UCC such paper is order paper (not bearer) and requires the ap-
parent indorsement of the nominal payee. See UNIFORm COMMERCUL CODE § 3-405,
Comment 1.
43. See, e.g., Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Cheltenham Nat'l Bank, 362 Pa. 30,
66 A.2d 768 (1949).
44. There is considerable-doubt as to whether section 3-405 applies to the agent's
submission of the names of real creditors having currently due claims. See Snug Harbor
Realty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 105 N.J Super. 572, 253 A.2d 581, 6 UCC Rep. Serv.
689 (App. Div. 1969), aft'd per curiam, 54 N.J. 95, 253 A.2d 545 (1969); J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at § 16-8 (good discussion of this and other § 3-405 prob-
lems).
45. Included in this list are some of the most cited negligence/negotiable instru-
ments cases, among which are the two Missouri cases relied upon by the Eighth Circuit
in Bagby; see note 6 supra. Since these cases are overruled by the Code on their major
point, hopefully their precedential value will collapse and the courts will examine the
subject anew. Cases excusing the drawer from the onus of his negligence in situations
where he would now be bound under section 3-405 are, e.g., Los Angeles Inv. Co. v.
Home Say. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919); Home Indem. Co. v. State Bank,
233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W.2d 757 (1943); Grand Lodge v. State Bank, 92 Kan. 876, 142 P.
974 (1914); Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740
(1909); Scott v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938); City of New
York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64, 184 N.E. 495 (1933); National Sur.
Co. v. President & Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N.Y. 247, 169 N.E. 372 (1929);
Gutfreund v. East River Nat'l Bank, 251 N.Y. 58, 167 N.E. 171 (1929); Coffin v.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 374 Pa. 378, 97 A.2d 857 (1953). The reason these
cases were not resolved under the "fictitious payee" rule of NEGOTUDLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW § 9(3) was that the technical drawer of the check was not the forger himself, but a
clerk who did intend the check to be paid to the named individual. The NIL had no
section equivalent to UNxrORM COMMERCAL CODE § 3-405(1) (c).
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normally in a better position to prevent such forgeries by reason-
able care in the selection or supervision of his employees, or, if
he is not, is at least in a better position to cover the loss by fidel-
ity insurance; and that the cost of such insurance is properly an
expense of his business rather than of the business of the holder
or drawee.
Note that section 3-405 does not depend on negligence vel non of the
drawer/maker but rather imposes strict liability for the forgeries
resulting from these situations. The section also protects later parties
even if they are negligent themselves (unlike sections 3-406 and
4-406). Only the forger himself is liable to the drawer-maker.46
The "bank statement rule" found in section 4-406 of the UCC re-
solves the pre-Code conflict over the effect of a drawer's failure to ex-
amine his bank statement.4 7  Subsection (1) of section 4-406 es-
46. Subsection (2) of section 3-405 states that the section shall not "affect the
criminal or civil liability of the person so indorsing." Though the drawee bank's negli-
gence is immaterial in section 3-405 problems, the bank must still observe a standard
of good faith to escape liability. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marine Nat'l Exch.
Bank, 371 F. Supp. 1002, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 462 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
47. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-406 states in full:
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompa-
nied by items paid in good faith in support of the debit entries or holds the
statement and items pursuant to a request or instructions of its customer or
otherwise in a reasonable manner makes the statement and items available
to the customer, the customer must exercise reasonable care and promptness
to examine the statement and items to discover his unauthorized signature or
any alteration on an item and must notify the bank promptly after discovery
thereof.
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an
item to comply with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1)
the customer is precluded from asserting against the bank
(a) his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if the
bank also establishes that it suffered a loss by reason of such
failure; and
(b) an unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer
on any other item paid in good faith by the bank after the first
item and statement was availablo to the customer for a reason-
able period not exceeding fourteen calendar days and before the
bank receives notification from the customer of any such unau-
thorized signature or alteration.
(3) The preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if the customer
establishes lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s).
(4) Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or
the bank a customer who does not within one year from the time the statement
and items are made available to the customer (subsection (1)) discover and
report his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the face or back of
the item or does not within three years from that time discover and report
any unauthorized indorsement is precluded from asserting against the bank
such unauthorized signature or indorsement or such alteration.
(5) If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against a claim
of a customer upon or resulting from payment of an item and waives or fails
upon request to assert the defense the bank may not assert against any collect-
ing bank or other prior party presenting or transferring the item a claim based
upon the unauthorized signature or alteration giving rise to the customer's
claim.
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tablishes the duty of the bank's customer to use reasonable care and
promptness in examining the statement and discovering and reporting
his unauthorized signature or any alteration of the checks. If the bank
demonstrates that the customer failed to do this and that it suffered a
loss thereby, the customer is precluded by subsection (2) from com-
plaining about that particular check, or later ones if other forgeries or
alterations are committed by the same wrongdoer and these checks are
paid fourteen days after -the statement was available to the customer
(the "repeated offenses" rule).4 s If, however, the customer can estab-
lish that the bank itself failed to use ordinary care in paying the check,
the section then adopts the common-law rule that none of the above
applies, and the customer is not estopped by his failure to examine the
statement.4" Thus there is no balancing test or rule of contributory
negligence; if the bank failed to use ordinary care it always loses,
whether the customer was negligent or not.
Section 3-406 (the "negligence" rule) has a similar provision. 0
Under section 3-406 the negligence leading to a material alteration or
an unauthorized signature is immaterial unless the party against whom
the material alteration or forgery is asserted (the later party) was either
a holder in due course or a drawee or other payor paying -the instrument
"in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial stan-
dards of the drawee's or payor's business." If the later party cannot
establish his own good faith and reasonable behavior, the prior negli-
gence is excused.
There is an important rule here for attorneys and courts with cases
This subject was covered by non-uniform statutes in more than forty jurisdictions. The
leading common-law case establishing the duty to examine bank statements is Leather
Mfrs. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886). See also Arant, Forged Checks-The Duty
of the Depositor to His Bank, 31 YALE L.J. 598 (1922).
48. The fourteen days for examination is a maximum not a minimum period; see
the exact language in section 4-406(2) (b) reprinted in note 47 supra. A jury could find
that the reasonable period for reconciliation was shorter than fourteen days, so that the
customer would be bound on other checks paid at the end of the shorter period. See
Winkler v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 42 Mich. App. 740, 202 N.W.2d 468, 11 UCC Rep.
Serv. 1031 (1972).
49. Cases representative of the common-law result are Leather Mfrs. Bank v. Mor-
gan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886); First Nat'l Bank v. Ketchum, 68 Okla. 104, 172 P. 81 (1918).
50. Section 4-406 requires the bank to use "ordinary care" in paying the item; sec-
tion 3-406 requires the bank to pay "in good faith and in accordance with the reason-
able commercial standards of the drawees or payor's business." Though different lan-
guage is used, it is believed that the two sections require the bank to observe the same
standards. See Note, Forgeries and Material Alterations: Allocation of Risks Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 B.U.L. Rnv. 536, 547-48 (1970). Thus decisions
under either section defining what is or is not reasonable conduct by the bank should
be precedent for cases arising under both sections.
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in which either section 3-406 or section 4-406 is being litigated. The
reasonableness of the conduct of the later party (section 3-406) or of
bank (section 4-406) should always be determined before any attention
is given to whether the other party's negligence substantially contributed
to the forgery or alteration (section 3-406), or whether a customer exer-
cised reasonable care in examining his bank statement (section 4-406).
If the later party or the bank is found to be in violation of the duty of
ordinary care or is not a holder in due course, there is no need to ex-
plore the issues of negligence or failure to examine the statement.
As to what is "ordinary care in paying the item" (the section 4-
406(3) test) or payment "in good faith and in accordance with the rea-
sonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business" (the
section 3-406 test), there are a few definite rules. First, section 4-
103(3) states that conduct pursuant to Article 4 or to the Federal Re-
serve regulations, operating letters, clearing house rules, and general
banking usage is prima facie the exercise of ordinary care. The attor-
ney representing a bank in a section 3-406 or section 4-406 lawsuit is
therefore well advised to investigate these matters and to introduce into
evidence the above documents or expert testimony on banking usage.51
The requirement that the bank follow general banking usage of course
means that the bank must observe certain routine steps before charging
the customer's account, such as ascertaining that all necessary indorse-
ments are on the check, comparing the drawer's signature with that on
file, and debiting the correct account.52 Secondly, the courts have al-
ways held that banks and other parties taking checks are strictly
accountable for ascertaining the authority of an agent to indorse or sign
51. The courts have rightfully declined to define "general banking usage" as a mat-
ter of law or to set rigid standards. See Cooper v. Union Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 85,
-, 103 Cal. Rptr. 610, 616, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 343, 352 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1, 12 UCC Rep. Serv.
209 (1973).
52. Cases in which the bank did not do these or similar things are First Nat'l Bank
v. Hobbs, 248 Ark. 76, 450 S.W.2d 298, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 323 (1970) (letting unau-
thorized individual sign signature card); Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149,
304 A.2d 838, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 922 (1973) (failure to get payee's indorsement); First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Cutright, 189 Neb. 805, 205 N.W.2d 542, 12 UCC Rep. Serv.
313 (1973) (failure to compare check with signature card); Mortimer Agency, Inc. v.
Underwriters Trust Co., 73 Misc. 2d 970, 341 N.Y.S.2d 75, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 270
(New York City Civ. Ct. 1973) (same); Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545,
403 S.W.2d 109, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 630 (1966) (same); Frost Nat'l Bank v. Nicholas
& Barrera, 500 S.W.2d 906, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (failure to
get payee's indorsement); W.P. Harlin Constr. Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.,
23 Utah 2d 422, 464 P.2d 585, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 521 (1970) (failure to check signature
card). For an article exploring whether banks actually do compare each check with
the signature card see Murray, Price v. Neal in the Electronic Age, 87 BANmNG L..
686 (1970).
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the checks of his principal; this rule holds true in both the pre-Code 5
and UCC cases.5 4 The authority of an agent to cash checks for another
will not be presumed. 5  A corollary of this rule is that banks must ex-
ercise some care in checking the identity of a stranger opening a new
account5 6 or cashing a check. 17 Beyond -this, only generalities are pos-
sible. The courts have said that the banks and others taking negotiable
instruments will not be protected if "suspicious circumstances" should
have alerted them to problems with the instrument. "Suspicious
circumstances" include sloppy or obvious alterations,15 presentment by
dubious characters,59 and, in some instances, fiduciary negotiations
53. See, e.g., Fargo Nat'l Bank v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 400 F.2d 223 (8th Cir.
1968); R. Mars, The Contract Co. v. Massanutten Bank, 284 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1960);
Walsh v. American Trust Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 654, 47 P.2d 323 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935);
Butler Produce & Canning Co. v. Edgerton State Bank, 91 Ohio App. 385, 108 N.E.2d
324, rev'd on other grounds, 159 Ohio St. 267, 112 N.E.2d 23 (1952); California Stucco
Co. v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 148 Wash. 341, 268 P. 891 (1928).
54. Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 304 A.2d 838, 12 UCC Rep. Serv.
922 (1973); Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162,
5 UCC Rep. Sen. 779 (L. Div. 1968), affd per curiam, 105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d
460, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 168 (App. Div. 1969); Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr.
Co., 231 Ore. 106, 370 P.2d 726, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 276 (1972); McConnico v. Third
Nat'! Bank, 227 Tenn. -, 499 S.W.2d 874, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 641 (1973); Womack
Mach. Supply Co. v. Fannin Bank, 499 S.W.2d 917, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 669 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973); DoAl1 Dallas Co. v. Trinity Nat'! Bank, 498 S.W.2d 396, 13 UCC Rep.
Sen,. 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Von Gohren v. Pacific Nat'! Bank, 8 Wash. App. 245,
505 P.2d 467, 12 UCC Rep. Sen. 133 (1973).
55. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1298, 1311 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Sen-
ate Motors, Inc. v. Industrial Bank, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 387, 392 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1971).
But see note 41 supra for cases in which the courts did hold the agent had apparent
authority to cash the principal's checks.
56. See Cooper v. Union Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 85, 103 Cal. Rptr. 610, 11 UCC
Rep. Sen. 343 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d
609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 209 (1973); Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. All Am. Nut Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 545, 34 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1963); Commerce-
Guardian Bank v. Toledo Trust Co., 60 Ohio App. 337, 21 N.E.2d 173 (1938).
57. See, e.g., First Nat'! Bank v. United States Nat'! Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 197 P.
547 (1921). The right of a drawee bank to require identification of a presenter is found
in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-505(1) (b), though one court had held that this sec-
tion is permissive, not mandatory; Wright v. Bank of Cal., 281 Cal. App. 2d 485, 81
Cal. Rptr. 11, 6 UCC Rep. Sen. 1165 (1969). Professor Dugan has suggested that
courts develop a test whereby those cashing checks would be protected only if they took
them from a "qualified" person, defined as "one who acquires third-party checks in the
normal course of his business," such as payroll and welfare check recipients. See Du-
gan, Stolen Checks-The Payee's Predicament, 53 B.U.L. REV. 955, 982-83 (1973).
58. Connecticut Say. Bank v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 138 Conn. 298, 84
A.2d 267 (1951); Critten v. Chemical Natl Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902);
First Nat'l Bank v. Ketchum, 68 Okla. 104, 172 P. 81 (1918); Exchange Bank & Trust
Co. v. Kidwell Constr. Co., 463 S.W.2d 465, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 1079 (Tex. Civ. App.),
writ refused, 472 S.W.2d 117, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 482 (Tex. 1971).
59. In Citizens Bank v. Blach & Sons, 228 Ala. 246, 153 So. 404 (1934) a clothing
store got stuck with a check it cashed for a stranger who was "a dirty kind of faced fel-
low" that "talked kind of fast' and had a "kind of a growth of beard on him."
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
which appear out of the ordinary.10 Some courts have gone quite far
in holding the bank responsible for investigating the underlying trans-
action whenever a detailed examination of the checks coupled with nor-
mal human curiosity should have led to further inquiry.61  For
instance, in Jackson v. First National Bank,62 a bank was held respon-
sible for paying a church organization's unauthorized checks made out
by the church's financial secretary, payable to himself and cashed at a
dog-racing track.
From the above it is apparent that the banks and others taking
checks following the alleged negligence may have a difficult task in
proving their own due care. Since this burden must be met before the
prior negligence becomes relevant under sections 3-406 or 4-406, I em-
phasize that this issue should be tried first. These sections are, in ef-
fect, "last clear chance" statutes. If the later parties had the last chance
to avoid the loss and should have seen and taken it, the prior negli-
gence is excused.
60. Some courts have held that the bank must investigate the underlying transac-
tion whenever it has "notice" that an agent is using his principal's fund for his own pur-
poses. See Jackson v. First Nat'! Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109, 3 UCC
Rep. Serv. 630 (1966). Here the court held that a bank had such notice because the
checks were made payable to the agent, by the agent, and were cashed at a dog track,
all of which was apparent from an examination of the indorsements. In an age when
banks handle thousands of checks each day, a rule requiring them to take cognizance
of the possible significance of the indorsements seems a bit much. A better rule would
permit the banks to ignore the possible meaning behind the indorsements unless special
circumstances demanded closer examination of the instrument. For a decision on the
duty of a depositary bank taking corporate checks for the benefit of an agent see Von
Gohren v. Pacific Nat'! Bank, 8 Wash. App. 245, 505 P.2d 467, 12 UCC Rep. Serv.
133 (1973). Contra, Cooper v. Union Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 85, 103 Cal. Rptr. 610,
11 UCC Rep. Serv. 343 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609,
107 Cal. Rptr. 1, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 209 (1973).
61. My comments in the preceeding footnote apply here too. In Gutfreund v. East
River Nat'!l Bank, 251 N.Y. 58, 167 N.E. 171 (1929) the plaintiff was a wholesale meat
dealer who employed a dishonest clerk. The clerk drew checks payable to "Swift"
(meaning "Swift & Co.", a regular creditor), and after getting the company's signature,
inserted an initial before the word "Swift." He then signed the purported payee's name,
indorsed the checks himself, and deposited the checks in his account with defendant
bank. The court held that defendant was negligent in (1) not noting that the checks
were probably meant for "Swift & Co." (defendant knew plaintiff's business), and (2)
not noting that the payee's signature and the clerk's were in the same handwriting.- As
I said in the prior footnote, this seems an impossible burden to place on the banks. See
also Mortimer Agency, Inc. v. Underwriters Trust Co., 73 Misc. 2d 970, 341 N.Y.S.2d
75, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 270 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1973) (negligent to pay a large
check); W.P. Harlin Constr. Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 23 Utah 2d 422,
464 P.2d 585, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 521 (1970) (negligent to pay a large check five months
old). Contra, S.S. Allen Grocery Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County, 192 Mo. App. 476,
182 S.W. 777 (1916) (not negligent to create overdraft or to pay a large check).
62. 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 630 (1966); see discus-
sion in note 60 supra.
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Section 3-406, as the primary code section concerning negli-
gence, deserves detailed examination. Since the exact language is im-
portant, it is set out again:
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes
to a material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an
unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration
or lack of authority against a holder in due course or against a
drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in good faith
and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of
the drawee's or payor's business.
Before defining "negligence" and "substantially contributed,"
there are two troublesome, technical points raised by section 3-406.
The first arises from the basic rule of negotiable instruments that no
one can qualify as a "holder" (and therefore as a "holder in due
course") following the forgery of a name necessary to the chain of
title.63 Thus, if the payee's name is forged on the back of the check,
none of the later takers will be "holders." One of section 3-406's three
protected parties is a "holder in due course," but how can such an an-
imal exist if an unauthorized signature necessary to the chain of title
is placed on the instrument? If the payee's own negligence substan-
tially contributes to the forgery of the payee's own name, section 3-406
suggests that there can be a later holder in due course, but does not
explain how the defective title is cured. One explanation is that the
"holder in due course" language refers only to material alteration prob-
lems, and that for forgeries, later parties must qualify as either the drawee
or a "payor," with the latter term meaning those transferring the instru-
ment for value. The problem here is that although "payor"0 4 is not
defined in the Code, the drafters were undoubtedly using it to mean
the party making the final payment on the instrument (for example,
the maker of a promissory note or the issuer of a certificate of deposit)
and not an intermediary party. Nonetheless, at least one court 5 and
one major commentary"6 have held or suggested that the word "payor"
may be expanded to include intermediaries. Other solutions are that
"holder in due course" in section 3-406 was not used in its technical
63. See W. BRrrrON, supra note 10, at 250. For a discussion ad nauseam of this
problem see Whaley, Forged Indorsements and the UCC's "Holder", 6 IND. L. REv. 45
(1972).
64. "Payor bank" is defined in UNIFoRM Co MERCIA. CODE § 4-105(b) as "a
bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted."
65. Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr. Co., 231 Ore. 106, 370 P.2d 726
(1962); see 48 IowA L. Rav. 1077 (1963) (criticizing the case on the point in question).
66. J. Wm-r & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 540-41 n.42. The authors therein
admit that this solution will "bend the devil out of the 'payor' language" and will give
"the draftsman gas pains."
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sense, but means instead "transferee in due course,"' 67 or that the draft-
ers did not consider the issue at all, but, had they done so, they would
want the courts to extend section 3-406 by analogy to transferees in
due course.08
The problem is best solved by reference to UCC section 3-307,
the procedural section. Under subsection (1) thereof, signatures are
initially presumed to be genuine or authorized unless challenged, in
which case the burden is on the person claiming thereunder. If that
person can prove that the other party's negligence substantially contrib-
uted to the unauthorized signature, section 3-307 ought to preclude
the negligent party from challenging the signature. Once the unchal-
lenged signature is admitted, the non-negligent party becomes a
"holder" 9 and can maintain his action per section 3-307(2). Thus,
although the court ought to try the issue of whether the suing party is
"in due course" first, it should reserve decision on his "holder" status
until the issue of precluding negligence is resolved.
The second technical aspect of section 3-406 is that the section
is phrased as a matter of estoppel to raise certain issues and does not
authorize an affirmative action for negligence. This estoppel works
against -the negligent party only-it does not prevent other parties to
the instrument from raising the matters of forgery or alteration. In one
case -the California Supreme Court failed to understand- this point and
held that the negligence validated the forgery involved and thus estab-
67. This view was first suggested by Palizzi, supra note 7, at 670-73.
68. J. WasfE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 541-42 n.42, presents quite a strong
case for claiming oversight by the drafters.
69. This assumes that his title is not defective in some other manner. If there
were a second unauthorized signature prior to the negotiation to him (e.g., a missing
indorsement necessary to the chain of title), the suing party would not qualify as a
"holder" for that reason.
70. The procedural steps in a section 3-406 lawsuit would be (1) production of
the instrument; (2) examination of the instrument by the court to determine if all neces-
sary indorsements appear to be on the instrument; (3) objection by the allegedly negli-
gent party to the lack of authority by which one of the signatures was placed on the
instrument; (4) a ruling by the court that resolution of this objection should await proof
by the other party of the precluding section 3-406 negligence; (5) proof by the alleged
"holder" that he took "in due course"; see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302; (6)
if this last burden is carried, proof by the same individual that the other party's negli-
gence substantially contributed to the making of the unauthorized signature; (7) a ruling
by the court on this last issue (with jury consideration of the factual issues involved);
(8) if section 3406 preclusion is found, a ruling by the trial court that the negligent
party is estopped to question the lack of authority by which the questioned signature
was made, along with an overruling of the initial objection above and a finding that the
other party is a "holder in due course." Of course if the suit is between an allegedly
negligent customer and his bank, none of this is necessary since the bank need not qual-
ify as a holder in due course, but only as a drawee which in good faith observed reason-
able banking practices. See id. § 4406,
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lished "good title" in the transferees so that they became "holders." 7'
I believe that giving the -transferees "good title" is a mistake because
it unfairly throws the burden of litigating the issue of negligence on
a remote party. If the rule is that the negligence works only as an es-
toppel against the negligent party, then, if a forgery necessary to the
chain of title is involved, later transferees will breach the warranty of
good title72 and will either have to take up the instrument and them-
selves litigate the section 3-406 issue with the negligent party or join,
as third-party defendants, the lawsuit between the negligent party and
the remote transferee. This can be better illustrated by the Bagby fact
situation, assuming only that Merrill Lynch was estopped by its negli-
gence to raise the forgery of Mrs. Bagby's name. Two further
questions concerning the other parties are presented: (1) did the at-
torney's bank (Traders National Bank) which collected the proceeds of
the check from Merrill Lynch's bank (Commerce Bank of Kansas City)
breach the warranty of good title, and (2) which of the two banks
should bear the expenses of defending Merrill Lynch's suit?
These are complicated issues and since my major subject is the
proximate cause logomachy, I will briefly present my conclusions. One
is stated above-the negligence validates the forgery only against the
negligent party. Thus Traders Bank did breach its warranty of good
title, and, between it and Commerce Bank, the former should bear the
expenses of litigation.7 3 This does not mean that Commerce Bank is free
to ignore Merrill Lynch's negligence when Merrill Lynch sues. Although
the cases are divided 7 4 1 believe the better rule is that subsection (5) of
section 4-40611 requires a payor bank to assert the section 3-406 defense
71. Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 123, 136, 507 P.2d 609, 619, 107 Cal. Rptr.
1, 11, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 209, 223-24 (1973).
72. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-207(1) (a).
73. Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 969, 11
UCC Rep. Serv. 776 (W.D. Mo. 1972), rev'd, 491 F.2d 192, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 1069
(8th Cir. 1974). The court so held and awarded Commerce Bank attorneys' fees. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-207(3) & Comment 5.
74. Compare East Gadsden Bank v. First City Nat'l Bank, 50 Ala. App. 576, 281
So. 2d 431, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 275 (1973) (payor bank need not assert § 3-406 in
drawer's suit) and Society Nat'l Bank v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 30 Ohio App. 2d 1, 281
N.E.2d 563, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 831 (1972) (same), with Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce v. Federal Reserve Bank, 64 Misc. 2d 959, 316 N.Y.S.2d 507, 8 UCC Rep.
Serv. 365 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1970) (payor bank must raise drawer's
negligence or be barred from suing collecting banks) and Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp.
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 195
(1962) (same). The reason for this dichotomy is the beginning words of subsection
(5), "under this section." The first two courts cited state that this means only section
4-406 defenses. I agree, but note that Official Comment 6 incorporates sections 3-405
and 3-406 into this section. As discussed in the text, there are good policy reasons for
trying the issue of drawer's negligence at this stage.
75. Quoted in note 49 s.ipra.
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against the drawer, give a vouching-in notice76 to the collecting banks,
and pass the litigation expenses to them. As between the payor and
the collecting banks, the latter had the best chance to avoid the loss,
and, traditionally, collecting banks bear the risk of forged indorsements.
If the payor .bank could ignore the drawer's negligence and pass the
loss to the collecting bank, what cause of action would the latter have
against the drawer? Section 3-406 does not authorize an affirmative tort
action for negligence; it simply provides that the negligence may work
an estoppel to raise certain issues as part of some other lawsuit
connected with the instrument 77-- normally a suit on one of the nego-
tiable instruments "contracts.17 8  The drawer's contract of section 3-
413(2) runs only to a "holder," which the collecting bank is not.79 To
avoid this lack-of-remedy dilemma, section 4-406(5) should be read
as requiring the payor bank to raise the section 3-406 negligence in
the manner of that section, as a defense, but the collecting banks should
bear the expense of the litigation win or lose since they are in the
breach of their section 4-207(1) (a) warranty of good title either way.
A decision like the California one, cited above, which has the
negligence validate the title for all parties, unfairly puts the expense
of litigation on the payor bank, a party in no way responsible for the
title defect.
76. UonORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-803 permits defendants to give notice to
those answerable over to the defendant to come in and defend or be bound by the judg-
ment.
77. The reason is stated in id. § 3-406:
[I]n the usual case the extent of the loss, which involves the possibility of
ultimate recovery from the wrongdoer, cannot be determined at the time of
litigation, and the decision would have to be made on the unsatisfactory basis
of burden of proof. The holder or drawee is protected by an estoppel, and
the task of pursuing the wrongdoer is left to the negligent party. Any amount
in fact recovered from the wrongdoer must be held for the benefit of the negli-
gent party under ordinary principles of equity.
The few cases to the contrary should be disapproved; see Wright v. Bank of Cal., 276
Cal. App. 2d 485, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 1165 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969),
criticized in 7 SAN DInGo L. REv. 349 (1970); Von Gohren v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 8
Wash. App. 245, 505 P.2d 467, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 133 (1973); cf. Taylor v. Equitable
Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 304 A.2d 838, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 922 (1973) (dicta). A
common law negligence action might survive the prohibition quoted above; see UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103. At least one other section of the Code recognizes
the availability of such an action for the negligent loss of an instrument; see id. § 3-
419, Comment 2.
78. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-413(1) (contract of maker or acceptor); id.
§ 3-413(2) (contract of drawer); id. § 3-414 (contract of indorser); id. § 3-416 (con-
tract of guarantor). The basis of an action by a drawer against the drawee for wrong-
fully charging his account is, id. § 4-401. There is no reason, however, why section
3-406 should not be raised in warranty actions, see id. § 3-417, 4-207, or in conversion
actions, see id. § 3-419.
79. It has neither good title, a sine qua non of "holder" status, nor possession of
the instrument, another basic. In addition, the original final payment of the instrument
is said to discharge the contractual liability of the prior parties; id. § 3-418.
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Most of the section 3-406 cases have not involved these technical
problems, but instead have explored the more substantive questions of
the meaning of "negligence" and "substantially contributes." Bagby's
incorporation of "proximate cause" and the "intervening criminal acti-
vity" rule into these terms was something of a surprise. 80 The early sec-
tion 3-406 cases all went the other way.
The first of these was the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in
Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Construction Co.,"' in which the payee's
unsupervised employee was forging the employer's name to the back of
checks and cashing them at a local store. The court held that the em-
ployer was negligent in failing to supervise the employee or audit the
company's books and concluded that "proximate cause" was no longer
an issue in these cases. The court held that "substantially contributes"
was the equivalent of the "substantial factor" test of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 433, and that certainly the failure to supervise
the employee was a substantial factor in the ensuing loss. Because the
store that cashed the checks was also negligent in not checking the au-
thority of the employee to cash company checks, however, the em-
ployer's negligence did not work an estoppel.
The leading case on section 3-406 is Thompson Maple Products,
Inc. v. Citizens National Bank,8 2 a decision of the Pennsylvania Superior
Court. In Thompson, a log hauler named Albers submitted bogus log
delivery slips to the company, which then issued him checks for trans-
mittal to the timber dealers it thought owned the logs. Albers forged
the dealers' names to the checks and cashed them at the defendant
bank on which they were drawn. Albers pocketed over 100,000 dollars
before he was caught and sent to prison. 83 The bank defended by al-
80. UCC decisions agreeing with the Bagby conclusion that negligence in the is-
suance of the check is not the proximate cause of the loss (stated as a rule with little
or no discussion) are East Gadsden Bank v. First City Nat'l Bank, 50 Ala. App. 576,
281 So. 2d 431, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 275 (1973); Sam Goody, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l
Bank, 57 Misc. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d 429, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 502 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1968) (negligent certification held not proximate cause). But see Brower v.
Franklin Nat'l Bank, 311 F. Supp. 675, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (neg-
ligent certification can be the proximate cause). A major case with facts similar to
Bagby came out the opposite way. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust
Co., 65 Misc. 2d 619, 318 N.Y.S.2d 957, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 541 (App. T. 1970), afl'd,
39 App. Div. 2d 1019, 333 N.Y.S.2d 726, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 1080 (1972) (holding that
a stockbroker/drawer's failure to follow the "Know Your Customer" rule was negligence
under § 3-406).
81. 231 Ore. 106, 370 P.2d 726, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 276, clarified on denial of re-
hearing, 231 Ore. 106, 372 P.2d 187 (1962).
82. 211 Pa. Super. 42, 234 A.2d 32, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 624 (1967).
83. The naivete of the crooks and forgers in these cases is incredible. They typi-
cally engage in their nefarious schemes for years and the very passage of time makes
[Vol. 53
1974] NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
leging the company's negligence in (1) not safeguarding the blank de-
livery slips, (2) not following its own practice of making duplicate de-
livery slips for separate transmission to the company's bookkeeper prior
to the writing of the checks, (3) giving Albers blank delivery slips to use
as scratch paper, and (4) delivering the checks to Albers for forwarding
to the true owners (Albers was not the agent of the timber dealers).
The court held for the bank deciding that the negligent conduct of the
drawer's business did substantially contribute to the making of an un-
authorized signature. The court decided that the section 3-406
drafters did not mean to continue the strict proximate cause rule of the
pre-Code cases and held that section 3-406 called for a "shortened
chain" of causation. This term was not further defined, but presum-
ably a "shortened chain" of causation at least rejects the "intervening
criminal activity" rule.
Thereafter several courts cited Thompson and adopted its "short-
ened chain" of causation test, frequently with a reference to the Gresham
conclusion that "substantially contributes" was the same as the "sub-
stantial factor" test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 4 Later Penn-
sylvania courts managed to get themselves into a muddle by reading sec-
tion 3-406 so that the word "substantially" modified "negligence" and
it virtually certain they will be caught. Though some escape, First Nat'l Bank v. Hobbs,
248 Ark. 76, 450 S.W.2d 298, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 323 (1970) (withdrew money and ab-
sconded); Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 59 Ill. App. 2d 235, 207 N.E.2d
158, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 903 (1965) (telephoned from Mississippi, saying "You'll never
find me"); Commerce-Guardian Bank v. Toledo Trust Co., 60 Ohio App. 337, 21
N.E.2d 173 (1938) (on being informed that the bank officers wanted to see him, forger
was "gone with the wind"), more commonly the wrongdoer comes to an unhappy end.
Cooper v. Union Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 85, 103 Cal. Rptr. 610, 11 UCC Rep. Serv.
343 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107
Cal. Rptr. 1, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 209 (1973) (suspended sentence); Grand Lodge v.
State Bank, 92 Kan. 876, 142 P. 974 (1914) (suicide); Commercial Bank v. Arden &
Fraley, 177 Ky. 520, 197 S.W. 951 (1917) (penitentiary); American Sash & Door Co.
v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d 1034 (1933) (jail); Salsman v. National
Community Bank, 102 N.J Super. 482, 246 A.2d 162, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 779 (L. Div.
1968), aff'd per curiam, 105 N.J. Super. 164, 251 A.2d 460, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 168
(App. Div. 1969) (prison); National Sur. Co. v. President & Directors of Manhattan
Co., 252 N.Y. 247, 169 N.E. 372 (1929) (prison); Hardex-Steubenville Corp. v. West-
ern Pa. Nat'l Bank, 446 Pa. 446, 285 A.2d 874, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 448 (1971) (pleaded
guilty); Von Gohren v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 8 Wash. App. 245, 505 P.2d 467, 12 UCC
Rep. Serv. 133 (1973) (prison); Price v. Neal, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762) (hanged).
Frequently the forger turns up as a major witness to help the bank establish the negli-
gence of the drawer; see Leather Mfrs. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886); Scott
v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938). I hate to digress in this fash-
ion, but I thought it worthwhile to point out that in appellate cases at least, crime
does not pay.
84. Taylor v. Equitable Trust Co., 269 Md. 149, 304 A.2d 838, 12 UCC Rep. Serv.
922 (1973); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 619,
318 N.Y.S.2d 957, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 541 (App. T. 1970), aff'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 1019,
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
not "contributes."85 The upshot of this is that causation is shortened but
"more than ordinary negligence" is required before section 3-406's
preclusion occurs.86 This transmogrification of section 3-406 has been
rejected by a New Jersey court: "The language of the statute cannot
be read to support such an interpretation; it states plainly that it is the
contribution to the forgery rather than the negligence that must be sub-
stantial." ' Until the Eighth Circuit's Bagby opinion was handed down,
no court exploring the issue had found that "proximate cause" was a-
live and well as part of section 3-406. To determine whether it is or
ought to be requires an analysis of the basic principles of negligence
law.
"IU. Tm ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENCE
To recover in negligence, plaintiff must prove the following four
elements:
(1) Duty. The defendant must be shown to have had a legal
responsibility to do or not do the act complained of by plaintiff.
(2) Violation of Duty. Defendant must be proven to have failed as
a matter of fact to meet this responsibility.
(3) Causation. Defendant's violation of his duty must be shown
-to have resulted in the harm to plaintiff.
(4) Damages. Plaintiff must prove the extent of his injury.
One of the major problems with the above formula is the meaning
333 N.Y.S.2d 726, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 1080 (1972); Commonwealth v. National Bank
& Trust Co., 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 1, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 1421 (Dauphin County C.P.
1972), a/i'd, 9 Pa. Commw. 358, 305 A.2d 769, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 896 (1973); ct.
Gast v. American Cas. Co., 99 N.J. Super. 538, 240 A.2d 682, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 155
(App. Div. 1968). Other courts finding section 3-406 estoppel for negligent issuance
are Brower v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 311 F. Supp. 675, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); Gordon v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., - Mass. App. -, 9 UCC Rep. Serv.
697 (1971); Ocean First Nat'l Bank v. Baird, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1092 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1971). As this article went to press Maryland joined the list of states
adopting a shortened chain of causation and rejecting "proximate cause" in section 3-406
cases; Dominion Constr., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 271 Md. 154, 315 A.2d 69, 14 UCC
Rep. Serv. 129 (1974).
85. Commonwealth v. National Bank & Trust Co., 56 Pa. D. & C.2d 1, 10 UCC
Rep. Serv. 1421 (Dauphin County C.P. 1972), af/'d, 9 Pa. Commw. 358, 305 A.2d 769,
12 UCC Rep. Serv. 896 (1973).
86. The strong dissent by Judge Rogers (joined by two other judges) in the Com-
monwealth Court decision rightly states that this reading imposes an impossible task for
a jury, which must determine what is "more than ordinary negligence." National Bank
& Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, 9 Pa. Commw, 358, -, 305 A.2d 769, 773, 12 UCC
Rep. Serv. 896, 901 (1973).
87. Gast v. American Cas. Co., 99 N.J. Super. 538, 543, 240 A.2d 682, 685, 5
UCC Rep. Serv. 155, 159 (App. Div. 1968). Maryland has also rejected this idea;
Dominion Constr., Inc. v. First Nat'! Bank, 271 Md. 154, 315 A.2d 69, 14 UCC Rep.
Sew. 129 (1974).
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of "causation." In a world where every action can be shown to have
multiple effects far into the future, how close a connection must there
be between the defendant's actions and the plaintiffs harm? The
courts initially resolved this problem by finding that the defendant had
no duty to the plaintiff in cases in which there was some causal connec-
tion but in which it seemed unfair to impose liability on the defendant.
When the term "proximate cause" came into its own, the courts con-
tinued to do the same thing, but now they based their policy decision
on the element of causation, saying that defendant had a duty, but the
violation thereof was not the "proximate cause" of the loss. This mys-
terious burial of the duty issue in the causation issue has been decried
by torts scholars, 88 who argue that it confuses the law to subsume the
policy considerations inherent in the development of duty standards
under the catch-all phrase "proximate cause." The Restatement has
abandoned the term in favor of "legal cause," which is defined as:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to an-
other if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability
because of the manner in which his negligence has re-
sulted in the harm.89
"Substantial factor" is a jury question; it is a return to the issue
of whether -the defendant's conduct was in fact a cause of the resulting
harm and has little to do with the questions of policy found in the duty
issue. 0 The second part of section 431, however, seems to resurrect
the duty issue as part of its "no rule of law" language. The Restate-
ment then lists some of the "rules of law" which destroy "legal cause"
and the defendant's liability for negligence.9 1 Among these is section
448, which is most relevant to our inquiry:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or
crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting there-
from, although the actor's negligent conduct created a situation
which afforded an opportunity to -the third person to commit such
88. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 42 (4th ed. 1971);
Green, 28 TEXAs L. R v., supra note 8, at 471-72.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
90. In a well known article, Professor Malone pointed out that some policy con-
siderations are necessarily involved in the factual determination of causation. Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956). Section 433 of the Restate-
ment lists some of the possible considerations for the fact finder in determining "substan-
tial factor," including the number of other possible contributing factors, the intervention
of other forces, and the lapse of time.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435-61 (1965).
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a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent con-
duct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situa-
tion might be created, and that a third person might avail himself
of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
This of course is a foreseeability test, and comment "c" to section 448
makes it clear that the basic test is whether the actor should have real-
ized that his conduct was creating an "unreasonable risk of criminal
aggression." All of this sounds unduly terrifying when applied to the
prosaic crime of forgery; nonetheless, the "unreasonable risk" test
sounds suspiciously like a test of duty, not causation.
The Restatement does not address itself to the meaning of the
language of UCC section 3-406, nor does Prosser, although he was the
original drafter of that section. The courts, Bagby excepted, seem to
agree that section 3-406 works a major change in the law, but there
is little guidance as to what and how much. The Official Comment
to section 3-406 expressly disclaims any attempt to define "negli-
gence.
92
It seems to me that this dearth of authority on the meaning of a
piece of legislation enacted in virtually every state in the country pre-
sents the courts with a splendid opportunity to start afresh in the devel-
opment of workable negligence principles. In filling in this blank slate,
the courts are best advised to eschew the "proximate/legal cause"
maze in favor of a more open statement of the factors involved.
Section 3-406 states that "negligence" which "substantially con-
tributes" works the preclusion involved. The courts must give scope
and meaning to -these two terms.
"Substantially contributes" should be viewed as meaning nothing
more than cause-in-fact, the sole issue being whether the negligence
was a substantial factor (the Restatement test) in the making of either
an unauthorized signature or a material alteration. This is a jury ques-
tion unless no reasonable person could find a causal connection
between the negligence and the wrongdoing. For instance, if the drawer
of a check is negligent in leaving spaces on the instrument but the
wrongdoer uses chemicals to erase all written matter except the signa-
ture and writes in completely new words and figures, the negligence
does not substantially contribute to the material alteration. 3 But the lack
of causal connection is rarely clear enough to be decided as a matter
of law, and in most cases should go to the jury. It is inappropriate
92. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406, Comment 3.
93. See id. § 3-406, Comment 4.. .
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for the court to use jury pre-empting doctrines such as the "negligence
in issuance" or "intervening criminal activity" rules to decide this
cause-in-fact issue. If these doctrines are to live on, they should be
considered only in constructing the duty segment of the negligence
ssue.
"Negligence" in a negotiable instruments problem becomes a
manageable concept if it is defined as "the violation of a duty created
by the courts." There are two elements to this definition-the
question of law as to whether a duty exists and the question of fact
as to whether the duty has been violated. Whenever section 3-406 be-
comes an issue, and it has been found that -the person raising section
3-406 is either a holder in due course or a drawee or payor paying in
good faith, the court should first make a decision on whether the al-
legedly negligent party had a duty to do or not do the questioned act.
In resolving this issue the court must take into account many policy fac-
tors such as the degree of commercial awareness of the party accused,
the financial impact of an adverse decision, the foreseeability of the
harm, the ability of later parties to protect themselves from the wrong-
doer, the degree of fault, and, perhaps most important, the extent to
which the party's actions are out of step with those of others in similar
situations. The courts should avoid presumptions when creating duty;
the commercial world is not so stable that yesterday's practices are
likely to have lasting meaning for even a fiscal year. The maxims of
the "proximate cause" decisions (decisions that were really deciding
questions of duty) have no place cluttering up section 3-406. "Neg-
ligence in the issuance is not the proximate cause of the forgery" meant
only that the drawer had no duty to be careful in the issuance of the
check, an idea which explodes when phrased as a duty question. Arti-
cle Three abounds with situations in which careless issuance leads to
strict liability. 4 "Intervening criminal activity breaks the chain of cau-
sation" is a statement that no one has a duty to foresee and guard
against crime, but every checkwriter knows this is untrue as he carefully
scores the rest of the amount line after writing out the figures and
94. See, e.g., id. § 3-405 (the impostor rule). Note the effect of being careless
with the issuance of bearer paper. Id. §§ 3-202(1), -207, -305, -306. Section 3-413(3)
creates absolute presumptions on issuance, careless or not. And mistaken signing of in-
struments, except in limited circumstances, is simply tough luck if the instrument is
transferred to a holder in due course. See id. § 3-305(2) (c); Burchett v. Allied Concord
Fin. Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 186, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 279 (1964). UNIFORM Cot-
MERCIAL CODE § 3406, Comment 7 preserves the common law result that mailing a
check to someone with the same name as the intended payee is precluding negligence
even though it is negligence in the issuance.
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00/100. Unfortunately the proclivity of criminals to tamper with com-
mercial paper is too well known to say it is a risk of banks alone.
The conclusion of some courts that blanks in an instrument but not
spaces could lead to precluding negligence (since in -the latter instance
an "entire instrument was intended") was a duty decision: Those sign-
ing an instrument had a duty to complete all blanks but no duty to fill
up every space which may possibly lead to alterations. It is certainly
true that not every space on the instrument need be crossed out; as
a practical matter no one will do that. But -this does not mean that
there is no duty to be careful with some spaces. We all know enough
to write the check amount on the left side of the blanks provided and
would not be startled to learn that we had a legal duty to do so or be
liable for the consequences.
The major problem with the duty issue arises in deciding how
specific the trial judge should be in formulating the law's requirements.
If the issue is phrased in a very general fashion the jury has great free-
dom to fill in the void left by the lack of detailed guidance. This gives
the law flexibility but not much predictability. If, on the other hand,
the judge makes the duty very specific, the jury's decision in determin-
ing whether that duty has been violated becomes a foregone conclusion.
As an example, consider the recurring problem of the allegedly negli-
gent conduct of mailing a check to someone having the same name as
the intended payee. The judge can phrase the duty issue in a number
of ways. The most general would be an instruction that check drawers
have a duty to use reasonable care in the delivery of the check. If the
instruction goes no further, the jury-room discussion is likely to be long
and heated as the jury resolves the issue of the violation of this duty.
But, if the judge is more specific and tells the jury that sending a check
to someone having the same name as the payee is a violation of the
drawer's duty, the jury will hardly need to leave the box.
The trick is to strike a balance between these possibilities, but I
believe that in the area of negotiable instruments any error should be
made on the side of specificity. In commercial matters (Bagby is a good
example) the jury is unlikely to have the experience necessary to re-
solve the factual violation question unless the trial court gives them def-
inite guidelines with which to work. Granted, the judge himself may
have little commercial orientation, but he is still in a better position to
explore the matter by checking past appellate decisions, scholarly ar-
ticles, etc. A general (and flexible) duty instruction may be appropri-
ate in noncommercial negligence cases in which the jury often has a
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real appreciation of the community's expectations, but the law of nego-
tiable instruments needs the predictability of more clearly defined duty.
This is not to say that the duty should be made so specific that we re-
vive the seventeenth century idea of a rule of law for every possible
fact situation, but certain recurring problems95 should invoke a more
or less uniform duty formulation.
Once the court has defined the duty, the fact finder must deter-
mine whether that duty has been breached. This is not always an easy
question, but it is always a question of fact. The judge may instruct
the jury that it is -the duty of all check drawers to place the numerals
and written figures on the instrument in a fashion so that the amount
of the check is not easily altered. Whether the drawer has done so
is then in the domain of the jury, which must study the check and use
its collective judgement to reach a conclusion.
Apply these tests -to the facts of Bagby and arguably the Eighth
Circuit should have ruled against Merrill Lynch. What the court in ef-
fect held was either that Merrill Lynch had no duty to see that its
checks reached the hands of its legitimate customers or that no reason-
able man could find that the attorney's possession of Mrs. Bagby's check
was a substantial factor in the forgery of her name. Neither of these
conclusions seems valid. The strict duty to know its customer was im-
posed on Merrill Lynch by the New York Stock Exchange rule 405
(and by its own operations manual) for the very purpose of preventing
negotiable instruments and securities from getting into unauthorized
hands. With such items the risk of forgery and wrongful transfer is great.
When Merrill Lynch itself recognized the duty, it should not have been
permitted to pass this loss to later innocent parties because of a techni-
cal presumption of lack of cause and effect. In addition, the court's
recognition of this duty is not an impossible burden for Merrill Lynch or
entities of similar financial stature. When the factors of foreseeability,
fault, and ability of later parties to protect themselves are considered, the
existence of a duty of care in the issuance of these checks becomes
clearer. The issue of violation of the duty, as well as the cause-in-fact
("substantially contributes") question, were for the fact finder and not
the appellate court.
IV. NEGLIGENCE IN SPECIFIC SITUATIONS
Certain negotiable instruments/negligence situations occur with
sufficient regularity that they deserve more elaborate discussion of the
95. Some of these commonly recurring problems are detailed in Part IV of this ar-
ticle infra.
19741
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
policy considerations involved. Hopefully the material below will be
useful to courts involved with the process of defining the duty of care
required by UCC section 3-406 and related sections.
A. Incomplete Instruments
By "incomplete" I mean instruments containing obvious blank por-
tions meant to be filled in at some point, as opposed to instruments on
which there are spaces never intended to be filled even though a wrong-
doer finds a use for them. Section 3-115 provides that incomplete in-
struments are negotiable when completed as authorized. If the comple-
tion is unauthorized, section 3-407(3) and 4-401(2) (b) permit later
holders in due course and the drawee bank to enforce the instrument as
completed whether or not the drawer/maker was negligent in dealing
with the instrument. As against others, section 3-407(2) provides that
an unauthorized fraudulent completion of an instrument operates as a
complete discharge of prior parties affected by the completion unless
they are "precluded" from denying the validity of the completion. The
section 3-407 (2) preclusion would occur if a party were negligent within
the meaning of section 3-406, though it is difficult to see how a non-
holder in due course fits into the categories of protected parties enu-
merated in that section.96 The only mention of blanks on incomplete
instruments in the Code is in Official Comment 3 to section 3-406,
which states that the section does not change decisions holding that it
is not negligence to leave blanks "in which a provision for interest or the
like" can be written.97 This comment seems strange in light of the strict
liability for completed blanks found in sections 3-115, 3-407(3), and
4-401 (2) (b), and I cannot help but believe that if a maker left blank the
provision saying "with interest at-%," the courts would use these sec-
tions to hold him to the amount inserted as long as it was within legal
limits and the note was in the hands of a holder in due course. It is only
right that in most instances parties are bound by the completion of in-
struments they signed and sent out "into a sea of strangers"; it is no sur-
prise that the note may return with the blanks filled in in an unau-
thorized way.
What then should the courts do with a consumer who signs a
printed promissory note containing many blanks (some of which may
be hard to see through all the Truth-In-Lending hieroglyphics)? This
problem is disappearing with the adoption of statutes prohibiting nego-
96. Perhaps as a "payor"; see J. WmmrE & R. SuMMEaS, supra note 7, at 540-41
n.42.
97. Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427 (1871), is such a case.
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tiable consumer notes or expressly preserving all defenses against later
parties, but not all states have such statutes. I suspect that a court
might decide that the duty not to leave blanks on the instrument does
not extend to the leaving of blanks as to minor matters on printed con-
sumer notes. Consumer paper purchasers already know they are in-
volved in high risk business; it would not seem unconscionable to let
them look only to their transferors. The duty issue can be phrased very
generally here: the consumer maker has a duty to behave reasonably
when signing a printed form note containing blanks. The jury, con-
sumers all, is in a good position to decide what is reasonable under the
circumstances.
B. Careless Spaces
Official Comment 3 to section 3-406 states that it is usually
negligence "where spaces are left in the body of the instrument in which
words or figures may be inserted." Rephrased this means the court
should instruct the jury that the drawer/maker has a duty to
score spaces on the instrument in which it is foreseeable that inser-
tions may be made.98 The jury must then decide if this has been done.
There are several pre-Code cases in which the drawer/maker signed
an instrument prepared by the payee, who deliberately left such spaces
so as to facilitate the raising of the amount of the instrument. A Texas
court found there was no negligence when a mother-in-law signed
a check prepared by her faithless son-in-law in this fashion, 99
but a Tennessee court refused to extend similar protection to a farmer
buying a cow,10° and a Florida court held it was negligent for an employ-
er to sign a paycheck drawn with spaces and presented for signature by
the employee/payee.10 1 These are all duty decisions with the courts
holding (impliedly) that a mother-in-law has no duty to eliminate spaces
on a check prepared by her son-in-law, but a farmer has such a duty
when the check is prepared by a seller, as does an employer signing
the checks prepared by an employee. The degree of commercial so-
phistication of the drawer and his relationship with the payee may be
the decisive factors. A mother-in-law may trust her son-in-law, but why
98. See UNnoa~m COMMRCAL CODE § 3-407(2); the word "precluded" is a refer-
ence to id. § 3-406.
99. Glasscock v. First Nat'l Bank, 114 Tex. 207, 266 S.W. 393 (1924).
100. Foutch v. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 348, 149 S.W.2d 76
(1941).
101. Goldsmith v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 55 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1951). Contra, Reiter
v. Western State Bank, 240 Minn. 484, 62 N.W.2d 344 (1953); cf. Gutfreund v. East
River Natl Bank, 251 N.Y. 58, 167 N.E. 171 (1929) (held negligence for employer not
to cross out spaces, but drawee bank also negligent in paying the checks).
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should a farmer permit a stranger to draw the farmer's own checks, at
least without careful examination before he signs his name? Later parties
will have trouble detecting the alteration since the instrument was cre-
ated to accommodate it and the alteration will be in the same handwrit-
ing as the body of the check. As for an employer's trust of his em-
ployee, section 3-405(1) (c) already makes the employer absolutely li-
able for checks made out to non-existent payees and submitted for sig-
nature. Official Comment 4 to that section adds that employee defalca-
tion in check preparation is a risk of business which may be foreseen
and insured. It is but a short step from that proposition to the creation
of a duty of the employer, particularly large solvent employers, to ex-
amine carefully all checks presented for signature to see if they contain
spaces facilitating alteration.
One more problem with spaces is the payee line on checks. Most
people know enough to score the unused portion of the amount line,
but many check writers leave the rest of the line following the payee's
name blank. If the payee's name is typed at the beginning of the line,
as it was on a check I received recently from a credit union, a thief
could type in "or (thief's name)" after the payee's name and then
negotiate the check to his bank. Section 3-116(a) provides that a
check payable to the order of alternative payees may be negotiated by
either's indorsement. If the typing matched fairly well, the drawee
bank would be justified in paying the check. There are problems with
establishing a duty to score the payee's line: (1) many drawers, in-
cluding large corporate drawers, do not currently do so, (2) the imposi-
tion of such a duty is then out of step with current practices, (3) the
equities of later parties is strong, but the drawer's fault is slight. The
problem does not seem to have arisen often, 02 and it may be that most
checks with alternative payee names would themselves alert later takers
to the possibility of alteration. A check stolen from the mails at tax
time should cause some comment if it was presented apparently pay-
able to "The Internal Revenue Service or John Doe" and is presented
by the latter to the drawee bank. A bank probably does not observe
reasonable commercial standards in paying such a check without con-
ferring with the drawer.
C. Instruments Written in Pencil
An early Illinois case took the position that writing a portion
102. But see Gutfreund v. East River Nat'l Bank, 251 N.Y. 58, 167 N.E. 171
(1929), where the court in dicta stated that a drawer has a duty to score the unused
portion of the payee line.
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of a promissory note in pencil was "gross carelessness" because penciled
writing is so easily altered,103 but some courts have held the other
way.104 The California Supreme Court in 1898 was unwilling to say
that "pencil writing is more readily effaced than ink or other sub-
stance."'105 This seems to be an ostrich approach to the world, and
a court might easily find a duty in most situations to not write
checks or notes in pencil. When the ease with which a penciled deci-
mal point can disappear is contemplated, the risk of alteration
of such instruments is properly placed on the pencil user. Most people
will not write negotiable instruments in pencil, so it is not hard to
find a duty to avoid the use. This is not to say that check writers
have a duty to use indelible ink, sensitized paper, or protectograph, 0
6
though a court might some day find such a duty on the part of very so-
phisticated drawers, such as banks, should the evolution of commercial
practice demand it.
D. Rubber Stamps
Official Comment 7 section 3-406 states that it is obviously
negligent to keep a signature stamp or other automatic signing de-
vice without proper safeguarding to prevent unauthorized use. The
cases agree, 0 7 even if the signature stamp was not meant to be a check-
signing device.' 08  The rule, however, only applied if the stamp con-
tains a facsimile signature-a mere printed name is not enough. 0 9
When the drawer puts his facsimile signature on a rubber stamp or
other device, he has created a dangerous situation and the courts should
103. Harvey v. Smith, 55 Ill. 224 (1870). See also Foutch v. Alexandria Bank &
Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 348, 149 S.W.2d 76 (1941).
104. See Commercial Bank v. Arden & Fraley, 177 Ky. 520, 197 S.W. 951 (1917);
Glasseock v. First Nat'l Bank, 114 Tex. 207, 266 S.W. 393 (1924); Lanier v. Clarke,
63 Tex. Civ. App. 266, 133 S.W. 1093 (1910).
105. Walsh v. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46, 52 P. 115 (1898).
106. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406, Comment 3; accord, Broad St. Bank v.
National Bank, 183 N.C. 463, 112 S.E. 11 (1922). The strong dissent in this last case
has meaning for the future, and I'm not sure that I don't agree with it.
107. Cf. First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Christian Foundation Life Ins. Co., 242 Ark. 678,
420 S.W.2d 912, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 287 (1967). The alleged drawer, however, fre-
quently escapes liability because the subsequent taker and/or the drawee should have
been put on notice by the age of the stamp or the fact that payment on a facsimile sig-
nature is not authorized on the bank's signature card. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Cutright, 189 Neb. 805, 205 N.W.2d 542, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 313 (1973); Mortimer
Agency, Inc. v. Underwriters Trust Co., 73 Misc. 2d 970, 341 N.Y.S.2d 75, 13 UCC
Rep. Serv. 270 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1973).
108. Robb v. Pennsylvania Co. For Ins. on Lives, 186 Pa. 456, 40 A. 960 (1898)
(stamp normally used to sign banquet invitations).
109. Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr. Co., 231 Ore. 106, 370 P.2d 726, 1
UCC Rep. Serv. 276, clarified on denial of rehearing, 231 Ore. 106, 372 P.2d 187
(1962).
1974]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
hold him to a duty of reasonable care in the protection of the stamp.
E. Delivery to Someone Other Than the Payee
It is clear from Official Comment 7 to section 3-406 and from the
one UCC case to date which involved the issue,"10 that a drawer has a
duty not to send the check to someone having the same name as the
payee. A more difficult question is whether the drawer has a duty to
avoid entrusting the check to someone other than the payee when their
names are dissimilar. In Thompson Maple Products, Inc. v. Citizens Na-
tional Bank"1 the drawer was found negligent for asking a log hauler to
deliver checks to timber dealers and giving him the checks; he was not
the agent for either the drawer or the timber dealers. In Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.," 2 a case similar
to Bagby but reaching the opposite result, the stockbroker/drawer was
deemed negligent for delivering checks to an attorney who misrepre-
sented his status as agent of the stock owners (failure to check his au-
thority was a violation of the New York Stock Exchange "Know Your
Customer" rule)."13 It may be that a court will find a duty to investi-
gate the authority of a purported agent before handing over a check
made out to the principal, since any time a check is held by someone
other than the payee there is a risk of forgery. This does not mean
that it is always negligent to entrust a check to one not the payee.
As discussed below -the drawer frequently must trust his own agents
to mail checks to the proper parties. As a solution, I suggest that the
jury be instructed that the maker/drawer has a duty not to entrust the
instrument to a person other than the payee unless the maker/drawer
has a reasonable belief that -the transferee will deliver the instrument
to the true owner. The jury may then decide the reasonableness of
the maker's/drawer's trust in the person taking the instrument.
F. Hiring and Supervising Employees
The basic idea behind respondeat superior is that those who would
110. Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 59 Il. App. 2d 235, 207 N.E.2d
158, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 903 (1965).
111. 211 Pa. Super. 42, 234 A.2d 32, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 624 (1967).
112. 65 Misc. 2d 619, 318 N.Y.S.2d 957, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 541 (App. T. 1970),
aff'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 1019, 333 N.Y.S.2d 726, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 1080 (1972).
113. The impostor rule is not applicable in a misrepresentation of agency problem
because the person dealing with the drawer does not pretend to be the principal. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-405, Comment 2. But see the clever way in which
Judge Younger of the New York County Civil Court worked around this rule in Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 63 Misc. 2d 960, 313 N.Y.S.2d 823,
7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1142 (New York County Civ. Ct. 1970).
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deal with the world through the use of agents must bear some responsi-
bility for the agent's activities. Employee defalcations injuring others are
not generally attributable to the employer unless he was in some way
responsible for the defalcation. In Article 3 of the Code the employer
may become liable for the employee's actions if the agent had apparent
authority to do the questioned act," 4 or if the acts are ratified.115 Be-
yond this, section 3-405 creates strict employer/principal liability if the
employee/agent submits checks for signature in which the latter has no
intention of giving an interest to the nominal payee. The resulting in-
dorsement of the payee's name, no matter who signs it, is "effective'
under section 3-405 and is not a forgery. In the negligence section, sec-
tion 3-406, the issue is the extent of the employer's duty to later trans-
ferees of the instrument to exercise care in the hiring and supervision of
employees.
Despite some pre-Code decisions which found no duty (using the
thaumaturgy of "proximate cause")," 6 most pre-Code" 7 and UCCI8
decisions have recognized an employer duty to hire and supervise those
employees who will handle the employer's commercial paper. All
114. UNImoR CoMMRacIAL CODE § 3-403(1); see the authorities cited in note 41
Supra.
115. UNIORM ColM]McAL CODE § 3-404 permits an unauthorized signature, even
a blatant forgery, to be ratified; cf. authorities cited in note 40 supra.
116. Hensley-Johnson Motors v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 122 Cal. App. 2d 22, 264 P.2d
973 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Home Indem. Co. v. State Bank, 233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W.2d
757 (1943); Scott v. First NaVl Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938); American
Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d 1034 (1932).
117. Corbett v. Kleinsmith, 112 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1940) (overconfidence of em-
ployer in clerk and failure to supervise her activities permitted her to steal S46,000 worth
of checks); C.E. Erickson Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Bank, 211 Iowa 495, 230 N.W. 342 (1930)
(employer did not follow own system of comparing paychecks with time cards); Detroit
Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Say. Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185
(1930) (failure to audit payroll after costs rose dramatically); Defiance Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Cal., 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935) (failure to supervise personnel man-
ager, who added phony names to the payroll for two years).
118. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 55 F.R.D. 436,
11 UCC Rep. Serv. 129 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (employing known gambler); Cooper v.
Union Bank, 27 Cal. App. 3d 85, 103 Cal. Rptr. 610, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 343 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1973) (employing gambler and not supervising her); Westport Bank & Trust Co. v.
Lodge, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 450 (Conn. 1973) (failure to call secretary to accounting
in spite of suspicious activity); Gresham State Bank v. 0 & K Constr. Co., 231 Ore.
106, 370 P.2d 726, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 276 (1962) (failure to supervise office man-
ager); Frost Nat'l Bank v. Nicholas & Barrera; 500 S.W.2d 906, 13 UCC Rep. Serv.
887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (hiring accountant without investigation and not supervis-
ing him); Womack Mach. Supply Co. v. Fannin Bank, 499 S.W.2d 917, 13 UCC Rep,
Serv. 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (same); Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Kidwell
Constr. Co., 463 S.W.2d 465, 8 UCC Rep. Serv.- 1079 (Tex.oCiv. App. 1971) (general
recognition of the duty).
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courts would agree with the California Supreme Court's statement in
Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home Savings Bank:"'0
Complaint is chiefly made that the company relied upon the hon-
esty of its heads of departments and the regularity on their face
of the demands or requisitions which such heads approved, and
made no investigation to determine whether such demands were
fraudulent or not. But trust must be placed in someone, . . .
and necessarily in heads of departments. If trusting them in re-
gard to demands for checks disbursements regular upon their face
is negligence, so it would be negligence to trust them in a hundred
other ways in which it is within their power to defraud their em-
ployer. Business could not be conducted on any such basis. It
is impossible for any large concern to investigate minutely in ad-
vance every demand for disbursement necessary for it to make in
its daily business. The delay and expense of doing so would be
too great.120
No court, however, should hold that an employer may hire a paroled
ex-forger, place him in charge of check disbursements, and fail to su-
pervise his activities. The desire to help life's unfortunates is noble,
but it is a bit much to take such a chance and then ask the drawee
bank to be, in effect, the insurer of a risk over which it had no control.
The same is true of hiring and failing to supervise individuals with sus-
picious pasts. Further, even those with impeccable records may turn
to crime. It is for this reason that companies set up security systems,
cross checks, and audits.
A number of factors play a part in deciding the scope of the duty
of supervision. Some relate to the employer's business: its size, its
compliance with accepted business practices for scrutinizing employees,
the amount of the checks written or received in the business, and the
enterprise's financial ability to bear the loss (has it, for instance,
bonded its employees-should it have?). Other factors involve the
faithless employee: his background and references, his financial
status, the quality of his performance, the amount of his responsibility,
and the ease with which he could defraud the company were he of a
mind to do so. The fact that an employee has given years of faithful
service may justify the employer in lowering his guard, 21 but even
119. 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919).
120. Id. at 610, 182 P. at 296-97.
121. This fact has impressed courts in the past. See Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank,
55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 630 (1966) (church officer had
a good record and reputation for twenty years); Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Kidwell
Constr. Co., 463 S.W.2d 465, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (employer
had no reason to suspect long-time employee, though she forged the employer's signature
On checks totaling $63,000 over a three-year period).
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longtime employees must not go completely unwatched. 122
Courts have found it a duty of most businesses to conduct a peri-
odic audit of sufficient -thoroughness to catch at least routine defalca-
tions.' 23 In addition, employers have a duty to investigate the possi-
bility of employee misuse of checks whenever suspicious circumstances
occur, such as dramatically rising production costs, 124 sudden unex-
plained affluence in a previously impecunious employee, 25 and missing
records. 126  Section 3-406 negligence is not limited to pre-forgery or
pre-alteration conduct, but includes failure to take protective action
when the forgery or alteration is discovered. 27 No one may sit idly
by and let known forgeries of his name go unreported; but for his
laches, the forger might have been caught. 28  The employer who
winks at discovered check misconduct cannot later complain to his bank
about that check or later ones. Phrased another way there is a duty
to take action when the first forgery or alteration is discovered and the
penalty for failure to do so is a preclusion from later asserting the
wrongdoing.
122. Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Lodge, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 450 (Conn. 1973);
Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'1 Bank, 80 Wash. 2d 121, 492 P.2d 534, 10 UCC Rep. Serv.
173 (1972).
123. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 95 Colo. 34, 32 P.2d 268
(1934) (no audit for five years); Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home
Say. Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185 (1930) (failure to conduct thorough audit);
Scott v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938) (audit disclosed a $15,000
shortage but employer did not investigate further).
124. Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Say. Bank, 252 Mich. 163,
233 N.W. 185 (1930).
125. Corbett v. Kleinsmith, 112 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1940) (employee bought a
$46,000 home though earning $135 a month); Scott v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77,
119 S.W.2d 929 (1938) (impoverished employee suddenly bought a nightclub and re-
furbished it lavishly); cf. Coffin v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 374 Pa. 378, 97 A.2d
857 (1953).
126. Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Lodge, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 450 (Conn. 1973);
Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 2d 121, 492 P.2d 534, 10 UCC Rep. Serv.
173 (1972). But see Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545, 403 S.W.2d 109,
3 UCC Rep. Serv. 630 (1966).
127. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-406, Comment 7, provides that the section
extends "to cases where the party has notice that forgeries of his signature have occurred
and is negligent in failing to prevent further forgeries by the same person." Cf. id.
4-406(2) (b), quoted note 49 supra.
128. Of course, this principle is not limited to the employer-employee relationship;
see Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Lodge, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 450 (Conn. 1973) (em-
ployer discovered forgeries but said nothing); Myrick v. National Say. & Trust Co., 268
A.2d 526, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1139 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970) (bank official told depositor
her account was depleted and she was surprised but said nothing for three months before
deciding to raise the forgeries); Neal v. First Nat'l Bank, 26 Ind. App. 503, 60 N.E.
164 (1901) (husband knew of wife's forgeries of his name but didn't complain until she
left him); Coffin v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 374 Pa. 378, 97 A.2d 857 (1953)
(partnership gave no notice of forgeries because it feared publicity and was trying to
get the money back from the forger).
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Whenever an employer sets up special procedures to avoid forgery
or alteration, courts have usually found a duty to follow the proce-
dures.' 29 Thus in Thompson Maple Products, Inc. v. Citizens National
Bank, 30 the log buyer's mill operator was supposed to issue one copy
of a delivery receipt to a hauler delivering logs and send a duplicate
by separate route to the company's bookkeeper office. At the office
the clerks were to issue checks in payment for the logs only when both
receipts had arrived. In actual practice the mill operator normally gave
both copies of the receipt to the hauler for transmittal to the office, and
thus the office did not become suspicious when one hauler drew up
phony receipts and submitted both copies to the office himself. The
court noted that the purpose of separate transmission of the copies was
to prevent exactly what happened, and found the company negligent
under section 3-406. With this decision compare Bagby,'8 ' in which
the Eighth Circuit held that it was negligent (but not "proximate"
negligence) for Merrill Lynch to fail to follow its own operations man-
ual procedures in dealing with purported attorneys and prospective cus-
tomers. The irony of such a rule is that the organization which takes
special steps to protect itself may be held to a duty to use reasonable
care in enforcing compliance with its procedure.' 32 Since the alleged
safeguards may give the company's commercial paper increased cre-
dence in the eyes of those dealing with it outside the company, 138 such
a duty to comply with the higher procedures should exist. There is
an analogy here to the general tort rule that one need not rescue some-
one in danger, but if such a rescue is attempted the actor must observe
due care in carrying it out.'
34
129. C.E. Erickson Co. v. Iowa Natl Bank, 211 Iowa 495, 230 N.W. 185 (1930);
Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of Cal., 180 Wash. 533, 41 P.2d 135 (1935). But see
Scott v. First Natl Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938) (failure to follow own
system negligent but not "proximate cause" of loss); City of New York v. Bronx
County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64, 184 N.E. 495 (1933). The last case is a fascinating
problem wherein the City of New York set up an "absolutely foolproof" plan whereby
payroll checks were "self identifying" and "as good as currency." When city employees
discovered a loophole in the plan which made forgery easier, the City sued its drawee
banks and the court, using the "unforeseeable intervening criminal activity" rule, held
for the City.
130. 211 Pa. Super. 42, 234 A.2d 32, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 624 (1967).
131. Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 969, 11
UCC Rep. Serv. 766 (W.D. Mo. 1972), rev'd, 491 F.2d 192, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 1069
(8th Cir. 1974).
132. See J. WrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 538.
133. City of New York v. Bronx County Trust Co., 261 N.Y. 64, 184 N.E, 495
(1933) (Lehman, Kellogg, J.J., dissenting).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Gavagan, 280 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1960); Lacey v.
United States, 98 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1951); Black v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
193 Mass. 448, 79 N.E. 797 (1907); Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., 158 Misc. 904, 287 N.Y.S,
134 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 867, 287 N.Y.S. 136 (1936).
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G. Bank Statement Reconciliation
The duty to use reasonable care and promptness in examining a
bank statement for the drawer's unauthorized signature or any altera-
tion is established by section 4-406(1). "Reasonable care" in this re-
gard is a question of fact, although an examination of the language
in section 4-406 supplies a few rules. First, the only things the drawer
is required to review are his unauthorized signature and any altera-
tion of the checks returned. Section 4-406 does not require the drawer
to examine the checks for forgeries of the names of other parties to
the check, such as the payee. If such a duty exists, and in unusual
situations the courts have been willing to say it does,'" 5 it would have
to arise under section 3-406 and not section 4-406.136 Nor does sec-
tion 4-406 require the drawer to reconcile the statement with his own
records, though the courts generally found such a duty at common
law"3 7 and should continue to do so under section 3-406.
When an employer delegates the task of bank statement examina-
tion to an employee, the employee is frequently the forger/alterer and
will not of course report his own wrongdoing. In this situation the
guilty knowledge of the agent is not imputed to the principal, but the
overwhelming weight of authority is that the prinicipal is bound by what
an honest agent performing the reconciliation conscientiously would
have discovered.' 38 Professors White and Summers have stated that
135. As a general rule there is no duty to check the indorsements. See Critten v.
Chemical Nat'l Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 228, 63 N.E. 969, 972 (1902). Special circum-
stances, however, may call for a closer examination of the checks so that the failure
to do so bars the assertion of forged indorsements. For example, in Prudential Ins. Co.
of America v. National Bank of Commerce, 227 N.Y. 510, 125 N.E. 824 (1920), the
drawer was found negligent in not investigating the validity of the indorsements where
it received letters from its customers complaining that they had not received the checks
involved. See also Scott v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938);
American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W.2d 1034
(1933). The reason this duty does not usually exist is that typically the drawer is not
in a position to know the signatures of the indorsers; unless circumstances alert him to
the possibility of forged indorsements, he may presume the signatures on the back of
the check are valid.
136. Nonetheless, section 4-406(4) has an absolute three-year period during which
the drawer must discover forged indorsements or lose his right to complain to the bank.
See U o mon COMMERCUL CODE § 4-406, Comment 5. If the drawer does discover
a forgery of a name necessary to the chain of title, the item was not "properly payable"
from the account and the bank must recredit the amount of the check; see id. § 4-401;
cf. id. § 4-407. The drawee will then sue prior parties for breach of the presentment
warranty of good title found in section 4-207(1) (a).
137. C.E. Erickson Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Bank, 211 Iowa 495, 230 N.W. 342 (1930);
Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Say. Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N.W.
185 (1930); Morgan v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co., 208 N.Y. 218, 101 N.E.
871 (1913).
138. See, e.g., Leather Mfrs. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886); C.E. Erickson
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it is arguably negligent under both sections 3-406 and 4-406 for most
employers to permit the same employee who disburses checks to do
the bank statement reconciliation. 3 9
Finally, under section 3-406 the courts have established a duty on
the part of the drawer to inquire of the bank if he does not receive
statements for an unusual period of time.1 40  If the bank statements
are disappearing there is usually an ominous reason-someone doesn't
want the contents revealed.
H. Certification
Section 3-406 has played a part in three remarkably similar
check certification cases, all from New York. In these cases the
drawer of a check procured the drawee bank's certification of a check
containing spaces which the drawer filled in after the certification
to raise the amount. In none of the cases did the certification stamp
make mention of the amount certified. The later holders in due
course, who were suing the bank on its certification contract,141 argued
that there was two-fold negligence by the bank in certifying a check
with spaces facilitating alteration and in failing to specify on the instru-
ment the amount certified. Two lower New York state courts held for
the bank, finding no duty on the part of the bank to study checks for
spaces or to state the amount certified (though both courts thought this
was probably a "desirable" procedure) .142 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York respectfully disagreed, not-
ing that it doubted that the New York Court of Appeals would read
section 3-406 so restrictively. 43  The federal court found the "any per-
son" language broad enough to include certifying banks and ruled that
Co. v. Iowa Nat'l Bank, 211 Iowa 495, 230 N.W. 342 (1930); Morgan v. United States
Mortgage & Trust Co., 208 N.Y. 218, 101 N.E. 871 (1913); Exchange Bank & Trust
Co. v. Kidwell Constr. Co., 463 S.W.2d 465, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 1079 (Tex. Civ. App.),
writ refused, 472 S.W.2d 117, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 482 (Tex. 1971).
139. J. Wm-E & R. SuMMERs, supra note 7, §§ 16-6, -7 at 538-40.
140. Myrick v. National Say. & Trust Co., 268 A.2d 526, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1139
(D.C. Ct. App. 1970) (six months); Terry v. Puget Sound Nat'l Bank, 80 Wash. 2d
121, 492 P.2d 534, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 173 (1972) (four months); cf. Gennone v. Peo-
ples Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 529, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 707 (Montgomery
County C.P. 1971) (duty of inquiry under § 3-406 met, but then drawer failed to com-
ply with his § 4-406 duty to examine the statements).
141. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-413(1), -410(1), -411(1); cf. id. § 3-418.
142. Wallach Sons, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 62 Misc. 2d 19, 307 N.Y.S.2d 297,
7 UCC Rep. Serv. 141 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1970); Sam Goody, Inc. v. Franklin
Nat'l Bank, 57 Misc. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d 429, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 502 (Sup. Ct. Nas-
sau County 1968).
143. Brower v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 311 F. Supp. 675, 7 UCC Rep. Sert. 1021
(S.D.N.Y..1970), noted with approval in 39 ForAm L. RY. 557 (1971).
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there was a duty of the bank to exercise-care in the process of certi-
fication.
The federal decision seems the better result; certifying banks
should be held to the duty not to certify instruments containing spaces
facilitating alteration unless the certification stamp clearly states the
amount certified. The very purpose for procuring certification is to
lend verisimilitude to the check by backing it with the bank's personal
obligation. This purpose will be frustrated if later holders cannot rea-
sonably rely on the apparent amount of the check. At the time they
receive it there will be no spaces on the instrument. The policy con-
siderations above apply here as well.
The cases have also placed liability on the certifying bank when
the alteration has taken place prior to the certification, and this rule
is clearly continued in the Code.144 When a thief steals the instrument
prior to certification, erases the payee's name, substitutes his own, and
then procures certification, the pre-Code cases145 held against the certi-
fying bank using NIL section 62(2), which stated that the acceptor ad-
mits the "existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse."
This language is now found in section 3-413(3) of the UCC, and the
pre-Code cases are expressly approved by Official Comment 5 to sec-
tion 3-417. In effect, the admission of the existence of the payee
found in section 3-413(3) amounts to a quasi-"Know Your Customer"
rule; it is also analogous to the impostor rule, section 3-405(l)(a),
since by certifying the check as presented, the bank is doing something
akin to issuing it to an impostor. Section 3-505(1)(b) gives the certi-
fying bank the right to get reasonable identification of the person re-
questing certification, and the above sections coupled with the negli-
gence rule of section 3-406 seem to convert this into a duty to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
The enactment of section 3-406 provides the courts with the op-
portunity to untangle the pre-Code inconsistencies and set up a system
of risk allocation based on rational factors. The early common law bias
in favor of excusing negligence and permitting the negligent party to
pass the loss onto others was based in large part on the fact that a bank
was usually the losing party, and, when the negligence was slight, the
courts felt more comfortable in placing the risk on a solvent enterprise
144. See Part IV B supra.
145. See sections cited note 139 supra. See also UNwoRm COMMERCIAL CoDE §§
3-417(1) (b)-(c).
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well able to absorb the loss.140 As time passed the courts lost sight of
utilitarian considerations and unthinkingly began to embrace doctrine
for doctrine's sake, most specifically the undefinable idea of "proximate
cause." This term was used in one case to permit an employer to fire
an employee who embezzled 12,500 dollars, rehire him and put him
in charge of check issuance and bank statement reconciliation, not su-
pervise his activities, ignore the fact that the supposedly impoverished
man had bought and refurbished a nightclub, and, when the forgeries
were discovered, pass most of the loss off onto the drawee bank since
the negligence was not the "proximate cause' of the check payments. 14"
This same decision is cited with approval by the Eighth Circuit in the
Bagby case.
In negotiable instruments law as well as elsewhere, "proximate
cause" has become a wild card doctrine and caused enormous confusion
in an area where some degree of certainty is a commercial necessity.
The courts will better promote this policy (and others such as uniform-
ity, increased negotiability, and rational risk allocation) if "proximate
cause" is discarded in section 3-406 suits in favor of a simpler test.
If the court finds that the accused party had a duty to do or not do
the act involved, and the fact-finder decides the duty was violated and
that this violation was a substantial factor contributing to the forgery
or alteration, section 3-406 precludes the raising of these defenses
against later non-negligent parties. Rephrasing the "proximate cause"
issue as one of duty is not iconoclasm; rather it is the appropriate judi-
cial response to the legislative mandate "to simplify, clarify and modern-
ize the law governing commercial transactions."' 4
146. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 4 P.2d
781 (1931); National City Bank v. National Bank of Republic, 300 Ill. 103, 132 N.E.
832 (1921); cf. UNIFORM COMMERCI AL CODE § 3-417, Comment 5 (adopting these de-
cisions).
147. Scott v. First Nat'l Bank, 343 Mo. 77, 119 S.W.2d 929 (1938). The court did
find that failure of the employer to investigate a $15,000 shortage disclosed by an audit
was negligence proximately causing the loss on checks issued after the audit.
148. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2) (a).
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